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NOTES
FULFILLING THE GOALS OF MICHIGAN V. LONG: THE
STATE COURT REACTION
INTRODUCTION
American federalism embodies a fundamental tension between the na-
tional government and the network of sovereign states.' This tension is
illustrated vividly by the continuing difficulty state courts have in analyz-
ing issues of personal rights guaranteed by the federal and state constitu-
tions.2 Since the application of the federal Bill of Rights to the states
through its incorporation via the fourteenth amendment, 3 parties have
been permitted to raise personal rights claims under both their state and
the federal constitutions.4 State courts, therefore, must analyze issues
from a double perspective.5
The necessity of dual constitutional analysis has resulted in a large
number of ambiguous state court opinions that fail to clarify on which
constitution they are based.6 These confusing opinions cause problems
for the United States Supreme Court when deciding whether to grant a
writ of certiorari.7 Moreover, this lack of clarity stymies the states' de-
velopment of their own constitutional jurisprudences.8
This Note reviews state court opinions that adjudicate federal and
state constitutional issues. Part I discusses the concerns implicated when
state courts fail to articulate the basis of their decisions. Part I also ex-
amines Michigan v. Long,9 the United States Supreme Court's most re-
cent attempt to clarify its position on review of state court decisions and
to encourage states to cultivate independent state constitutional jurispru-
dence. Part II first sets forth the structure of the survey, including the
cases examined and method of analysis used. It then explores the various
styles state courts employ to delineate the bases of their decisions. Using
1. See Schlueter, Judicial Federalism and Supreme Court Review of State Court Deci-
sions: A Sensible Balance Emerges, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1079, 1081-82 (1984).
2. For a discussion of dual constitutionalism, see Brennan, The Bill of Right" State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 59 N.Y. St. B.J. 10, 10-11 (May
1987); Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism In Practice and Principle, 42 Rec. of N.Y. B.A. 285,
288-94 (1987); Comment, Supreme Court Review of State Court Cases: Principled Feder-
alism or Selective Bias?, 36 Emory L.J. 1279, 1279-83 (1987).
3. For a discussion of incorporation, see Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the
States'Bills of Rights, 9 U. Bait. L. Rev. 379, 380-83 (1980).
4. See, eg., People v. Deitchman, 695 P.2d 1146, 1148 (Colo. 1985); State v. Bar-
nett, 68 Haw. 32, 36, 703 P.2d 680, 683 (1985).
5. State courts now must be able to engage in both federal and state constitutional
analyses. See State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148, 1150-52 (Me. 1984).
6. For examples, see infra notes 154-68 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
8. Cf Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039-40 (1983) (stating Court hoped to
foster independent development of state constitutional jurisprudence).
9. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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the results of the survey, Part II examines the extent to which each type
of opinion-writing has satisfied the two goals of Michigan v. Long.
This Note concludes that, despite fairly plain guidance from the
Supreme Court and the current interest in broadening the scope of state
constitutional protection, 10 most state courts fail to indicate clearly the
basis for their constitutional rulings."1 Until states make a clear delinea-
tion between state and federal constitutional analysis, the working rela-
tionship between state high courts and the Supreme Court will remain
uneasy, and sovereign State constitutional law will not evolve fully.
I. MICHIGAN V. LONG AND THE CONCERNS ADDRESSED BY THE
PLAIN STATEMENT REQUIREMENT
State high courts engage in both federal and state constitutional analy-
sis when addressing a party's claim that her personal rights have been
violated.12 When a state court bases a decision on the federal Constitu-
tion, the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the
case.13 The Supreme Court, however, will refuse to review a state court
decision that is based on independent and adequate state constitutional
grounds.14 This occurs for several reasons, 5 the most important of
10. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have seen an increase in independent state con-
stitutional interpretation and interest. See Brennan, supra note 2, at 17 (noting increasing
unwillingness by state courts to follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court);
Note, The Use of State Constitutional Provisions in Criminal Defense after Michigan v.
Long, 65 Neb. L. Rev. 605, 606 (1987) (concluding this pattern is a response to the
"evolving federal hostility to civil rights jurisprudence"). This increase may signal the
beginning of a more rapid move by states to clarify their constitutional position in their
opinions. See id., supra, at 629-30. Colorado, Maryland, New Hampshire, and Oregon
already have adopted such a policy. See, e.g., infra notes 65-75, 91-95, 188-91 and ac-
companying text.
11. See Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State Ground in Criminal
Cases: Federalism Along a Mobius Strip, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 799, 836-38 (1985).
12. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
13. The Supreme Court has the authority to review all cases that contain a federal
question. See U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1 & 2 (vesting judicial power in Supreme Court
and extending Court's power to cases arising under federal constitution and laws); Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (Supreme Court may review state court
decisions involving a federal constitutional issue, including cases adjudicated in state judi-
cial system); 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) (procedural statute dealing with Supreme Court
review of state cases and certiorari). See generally Schlueter, supra note 1, at 1080-83
(overview of Supreme Court jurisidiction over state court decisions).
14. See Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 489 (1965) (quoting
Cramp v. Bd. of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) for proposition that the Court's
"jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is indpendent of the federal ground and ade-
quate to support the judgment"); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945) ("Our
only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly
adjudge federal rights."); Fox Film, Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) ("settled
rule" that Court will not review state court decisions based on both federal and
nonfederal grounds if nonfederal ground is both independent and adequate to support
state court judgment); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635-36
(1875) (early expression of adequate and independent doctrine).
15. Most scholars view the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine as one
that has developed as a result of Supreme Court traditions of self-restraint, see Matasar &
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which is the desire to avoid issuing an advisory opinion. 6
Advisory opinions usually result because the state high court has en-
gaged in an ambiguous constitutional analysis. 7 Under such circum-
stances, if the Supreme Court reviewed a state case upholding a
constitutional rights claim, 8 reversed, and remanded it to the state high
court, 19 the state court might decide to reinstate its original ruling solely
on state constitutional grounds, 0 thus rendering the Supreme Court's
opinion advisory.2" If, however, the state court cleariy had based its
Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the
Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1291, 1322 (1986),
respect for state courts, and unwillingness to issue advisory opinions. See Schlueter,
supra note 1, at 1084. Neither the federal constitution nor congressional enactments
mandate this doctrine. See Matasar & Bruch, supra, at 1295.
16. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); Matasar & Bruch, supra note
15, at 1301-10. In addition to the philosophical policies of respect for state autonomy and
dual judicial systems, see Matasar & Bruch, supra note 15, at 1310 n.74, the pragmatic
problems of a swollen docket and limited judicial resources have made the Court hesitant
to review a state case when there is a good chance the state court will ignore the Supreme
Court and reinstate its original judgment on remand. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1068 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint,
66 Judicature 177, 180 (1982).
17. See Collins & Galie, Upholding Rights Left Unprotected By U.S. Supreme Court
Decisions, Nat' L.J., Nov. 9, 1987, at 32, col. 1-2; infra notes 154-77 and accompanying
text.
18. See Collins & Galie, supra note 17, at 32, col. 1 ("Between October 1983 and July
1987, the Supreme Court reviewed 33 criminal justice cases in which a state court upheld
a constitutional rights claim. During these four Supreme Court terms, 72 percent of
these cases were reversed."); Comment, Michigan v. Long" The Inadequacies of In-
dependent and Adequate State Grounds, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 159, 162 (1987) (chart of
certiorari dockets).
19. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text; see also Collins, High Court's
Rights-Claims Record: A Challenge to 'New Federalism'?, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 31, 1987, at
26, col. 1-2.
To differentiate the original state court opinion from the one on remand, this Note uses
a roman numeral I to indicate the original opinion and roman numeral II to indicate the
state court's opinion following reversal by the United States Supreme Court.
20. The state court, however, might choose to follow one of several other paths. It
might acknowledge the Supreme Court's reversal pro forma, without further discussion.
See, e.g., State v. Rogers II, 28 Ohio St. 3d 427, 427, 504 N.E.2d 52, 53 (1986). It might
find an outcome under the state constitution, in agreement with the Supreme Court's
reversal. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sheppard II, 394 Mass. 381, 391, 476 N.F2d 541,
547 (1985). It may redecide the case on other federal grounds and reinstate its original
holding that there was some sort of rights violation. See, eg., State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d
255, 258-60 (Mont. 1983) (redeciding case in light of South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S.
553 (1983), and rejecting argument that there are adequate and independent state
grounds to support the determination).
21. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983) (" 'if the same judgment would
be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review
could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion' " (quoting Herb v. Pitcairn, 324
U.S. 117, 126 (1945))); see, eg., People v. Ramos II, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 207
Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1119 (1985); State v. Neville II, 346 N.W.2d
425 (S.D. 1984).
For example, in State v. Neville I, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1981), the South Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of evidence that the defendant refused to take a
blood alcohol test. Id. at 726. The court also addressed the constitutionality of the state
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original holding on the state constitution, this series of decisions would
have been avoided. 2
The definition of what constitutes a state court decision based on ade-
quate and independent state grounds23 has caused continuous debate
among justices of both the United States Supreme Court and state high
courts.2 4 The Supreme Court has addressed this difficult problem on sev-
statute that allowed admission of such a refusal. Id. at 725. ("the question before us
today is whether SDCL 32-23-10.1 is a violation of Neville's federal and state constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination"). In so doing, both constitutions were men-
tioned briefly at the outset and close of the opinion, but only a federal fifth amendment
analysis followed. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed the South Dakota
Supreme Court's decision, finding that although the South Dakota court supported its
holding with an adequate state ground, the state ground lacked independence. South
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 556 n.5 ("Although this would be an adequate state
ground for decision, we do not read the opinion as resting on an independent state
ground." (emphasis in original)). But see id. at 567-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the South Dakota decision was based on both adequate and independent state
grounds). On remand, in State v. Neville II, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D. 1984), the South
Dakota Supreme Court found that despite the Supreme Court's reversal, the state consti-
tution still failed to allow admission of the evidence. Id. at 429-30.
22. See Collins & Galie, supra note 17 at 32, col. 2; Stevens, supra note 16, at 180-81.
23. A state court decision is independent if it relies on state law that is not tied to
federal law, such as a provision of the state constitution. See Matasar & Bruch, supra
note 15, at 1292 n.2; Schlueter, supra note 1, at 1084-85. If the Supreme Court concludes
that the state court rested its decision on an independent state ground, it must then find
that the state ground was adequate to support the state court's ultimate determination.
See Schlueter, supra note 1, at 1085. The Supreme Court will deny review of a state court
decision when these requirements have been met. See, e.g., Colorado v. Nunez, 465 U.S.
324 (1984) (per curiam); Aimone v. Finley, 465 U.S. 1095 (1984); Florida v. Casal, 462
U.S. 637 (1983) (per curiam); see also infra note 96 and accompanying text.
The application of the federal Bill of Rights to the States through its incorporation via
the fourteenth amendment has complicated the determination 'f whether a state court
has based its decision on adequate and independent state grounds. As a result of incorpo-
ration, state courts increasingly have addressed civil liberty issues encompassed by both
state and federal constitutional provisions. See Althouse, How to Build A Separate
Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1485, 1490 (1987)
("[I]ncorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment has layered federal
constitutional law onto state criminal law"); Collins & Galie, Models of Post-Incorpora-
tion Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, 55
U. Cin. L. Rev. 317, 322 (1986) ("Incorporation has had an enormous impact on the
constitutional law applied by state courts. After incorporation, there are no entirely in-
dependent models of state judicial review.").
24. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1996-97 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28, 31-33 (1985) (per curiam) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 252 (1984) (per curiam) (White, J.,
dissenting); Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 736 (1984) (per curiam) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039-42 (1983); South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364, 395-96 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); People v. Timmons, 690 P.2d
213, 218-19 (Colo. 1984) (Erickson, C.J., dissenting); State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 685,
672 P.2d 561, 563 (1983) (Bistline, J., dissenting); State v. Brown, 708 S.W.2d 140, 147
(Mo. 1986) (Welliver, J., dissenting in part). For articles on this topic written by
Supreme Court and state court justices, see Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Consti-
tutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1141 (1985); Bren-
nan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489
(1977); Kaye, supra note 2; Linde, supra note 3; and O'Connor, Trends in the Relation-
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eral occasions in an effort to give uniform guidance to the states and to
achieve a workable method of review, as well as to preserve relative au-
tonomy between the state and federal judicial systems. 5
Prior to 1983, the United States Supreme Court presumed that a state
court decision, ambiguous as to its foundation, was based on state
grounds and thus denied review of the case.26 In 1983, however, it de-
cided Michigan v. Long,2 7 and dramatically shifted its position with re-
spect to review of state court decisions. 8 The Court said it would
presume that federal jurisdiction exists and would grant certiorari despite
any ambiguity, unless state law grounds appear clear from the face of the
opinion.29 In addition, for the first time, the Court formulated the plain
statement rule, establishing stylistic guidelines for state courts to follow
when adjudicating dual constitutional claims.3" Justice O'Connor wrote
ship Between the Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 801 (1981).
25. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (presumption in favor
of federal review); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 217-21 (1983) (history of the doctrine);
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945) (no review of decisions based on adequate
and independent state grounds); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940)
(vacating so as to seek clarification from the state court); Lynch v. New York ex reL
Pierson, 293 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1934) (declining review if the basis for the decision was at all
unclear).
A year before Michigan v. Long, the United States Supreme Court decided City of
Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982), which stated that lower federal
courts also could rest their rulings on independent and adequate state grounds so as to
preclude Supreme Court review. 1d. at 293-95. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit followed this suggestion by engaging exclusively in a state law analysis when it
invalidated a city law prohibiting the solicitation of donations in certain areas used by a
local stadium. See Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1042-50 (9th Cir. 1985);
see also Collins & Galie, supra note 23, at 346-48 (discussion of Carreras).
26. See e.g., Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 491-92 (1965);
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-28 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207,
209-10 (1935).
27. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
28. See O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1984) ("the
Supreme Court adopted a new approach to resolving ambiguity about the existence of an
adequate and independent state ground") (emphasis in original); Comment, supra note 2,
at 1285 (Supreme Court adopted an activist approach to state court review).
In Long, Justice O'Connor first discussed the difficulties of determining the meaning of
"adequate and independent" state grounds as a standard for precluding federal review.
Long, 463 U.S. at 1038-39. The Court rejected as unsatisfactory previous methods of
dealing with ambiguous state cases, such as dismissing the case or vacating the case for
clarification. Id at 1039 ("This ad hoc method of dealing with cases that involve possible
adequate and independent state grounds is antithetical to the doctrinal consistency that is
required when sensitive issues of federal-state relations are involved.").
29. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). Justice Stevens, in his dissent
to Long, demonstrated the novelty of this jurisidictional approach, listing four possible
ways of determining whether the Michigan Supreme Court had based its ruling on an
interpretation of the Michigan Constitution that was independent of federal law. See
Long, 463 U.S. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The fourth method was the one articu-
lated by Justice O'Connor in the majority opinion. Justice Stevens noted that "[t]his
Court has, on different occasions, employed each of the first three approaches; never until
today has it even hinted at the fourth." Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id at 1041. At trial, respondent Long was convicted of possession of marijuana,
1988] 1045
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the majority opinion which held that when
a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or
to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and
independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the
face of the opinion, [this Court] will accept as the most reasonable
explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because
it believed that federal law required it to do so.... If the state court
decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on
bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, [this Court]...
will not undertake to review the decision.31
By establishing the plain statement rule, the Supreme Court hoped to
eliminate, or at least reduce, the number of its opinions that are rendered
advisory when, on remand, the state court reinstates its original ruling on
state grounds.32 Further, it intended to encourage state judges to develop
an independent body of state constitutional law. 3
When a state court upholds constitutional rights claims, it is essential
that it comply with the plain statement rule. To do so, the state court
must indicate whether it based its decision upon federal or state law.
Such compliance decreases the number of advisory opinions issued by the
Supreme Court because it allows the Court to grant review of a case only
where the state court based its decision of the issue in question on federal
law. In addition to fulfilling this first goal of Michigan v. Long,34 reduc-
found by police in the passenger compartment and trunk of his car. Id. at 1036. The
Michigan Supreme Court reversed Long's conviction, finding the searches of both the
trunk and passenger compartment illegal. Id. at 1037 (citing People v. Long, 413 Mich.
461, 472, 320 N.W.2d 866, 869 (1982)). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
(1) the validity of the search in light of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and (2) Long's
argument that the decision below rested on an adequate and independent state ground
and was, therefore, beyond the Supreme Court's jurisidiction. Long, 463 U.S. at 1037.
The Supreme Court reversed the Michigan Supreme Court's search and seizure determi-
nation and remanded the case to the Michigan Supreme Court. Id. at 1053.
In addressing Long's state grounds argument, Justice O'Connor took the opportunity
to discuss the longstanding jurisidictional problem of the Supreme Court's ability to re-
view state court decisions. Id. at 1038-42. Long had argued that, in the past, Michigan
courts had provided greater protection from illegal searches and seizures under the state
constitution than was afforded by the fourth amendment and, therefore, the references to
the Michigan Constitution supported an adequate and independent decision by the Mich-
igan Supreme Court. Id. at 1037-38. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, dis-
agreed, however, stating that two brief references to the Michigan Constitution did not
establish an independent determination. Id. at 1043-44.
31. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (emphasis added). Justice
O'Connor continued:
If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the
precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain
statement in its judgement or opinion that the federal cases are being used only
for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the
court has reached.
Id. at 1041.
32. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
33. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1041.
34. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
1046 [Vol. 56
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ing the number of state cases open to review by the Supreme Court also
clears its docket, an important concern of the Court."
Even when a state court rejects a constitutional rights claim,36 the
court should adopt a policy of following the plain statement rule so as to
develop a body of independent state constitutional law, the second aim of
Michigan v. Long.3 7 From the state court's perspective, there are several
theoretical reasons for encouraging clearly written opinions. Because lit-
igants are entitled to raise state constitutional claims, these claims merit
unique attention under the state constitution. 8 Moreover, state citizens
have an interest in understanding the importance of their state constitu-
tion and its effect on their lives.39 Finally, from a practical standpoint,
state courts should endeavor to establish consistency in their adjudica-
tion of constitutional claims. Clarity in opinion writing addresses all
these concerns successfully.
II. STATE COURT RESPONSE TO MICHIGAN v. LONG
A. Methodology
This Note explores state reaction to the objectives set forth in Michi-
gan v. Long as seen through an examination of caselaw. The survey ex-
amines over five hundred state cases that involved constitutional rights
claims decided from July 6, 1983, the date the Court issued Michigan v.
Long, to January 1988.40 It contains examples from all fifty states.4 The
majority of cases surveyed involve criminal prosecutions,4" although a
35. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36. When a state court finds no constitutional violation under the state constitution, it
also implicitly holds that there is no federal constitutional violation either. See, eg., State
v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148 (Me. 1984). Because the federal constitution provides a
threshold of protection, the state constitution may only broaden the available protection.
37. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1041.
38. See, eg., State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148, 1150-52 (Me. 1984); State v. Ball, 124
N.H. 226, 232, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (1983); Kaye, supra note 2, at 296-99.
39. Cf Linde, supra note 3, at 380 (state courts "take primary responsibility for most
of the individual rights that concern most people most of the time").
40. State court opinions that constitute this survey were collected in a number of
ways. The author conducted computer searches, on both Lexis and Westlaw, according
to key phrases, such as "adequate and independent." The base of cases amassed for each
state from the computer searches led to others that also dealt with the issue. Further,
cases were found through articles on the subject of state constitutional law and by
shepardizing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), and several important state
supreme court cases. E.g., State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983); State v.
Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983).
41. States that are well represented include Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,
Kansas, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York and Wyoming. The state cases used as
examples in each category of cases, see infra notes 59-205 and accompanying text, were
selected because those opinions provide clear models of styles that should or should not
be followed. The discussion tries to examine cases from throughout the United States,
rather than concentrating on those representing any one region.
42. Most of the criminal cases examined dealt with search and seizure issues. See.
e.g., People v. Corr, 682 P.2d 20 (Colo.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984); State v. Bar-
nett, 68 Haw. 32, 703 P.2d 680 (1985); State v. Havlat, 218 Neb. 602, 357 N.W.2d 464
1988] 1047
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few cases address other constitutional issues.4"
This Note categorizes the cases examined according to their lan-
guage-the actual wording of the opinions-rather than according to ju-
risprudence or conceptual methodology. In contrast, most
commentators characterize methods of constitutional review according
to three basic models:4" the primacy theory,45 the coequal approach,46
(1984); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 n.8 (1983) (Justice O'Connor
noted that, increasingly, the majority of criminal cases are filed in state, as opposed to
federal, courts).
43. See, e.g., People ex reL Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 324, 480 N.E.2d
1089, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1985) (free speech), rev'd and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986);
Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App.) (right to privacy), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
290 (1986); Witters v. Washington State Comm'n for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 689
P.2d 53 (1984) (en banc) (separation of church and state), rev'd and remanded sub nom.,
Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
44. See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 24, at 1169; Pollock, Adequate and Independ-
ent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and Federal
Courts, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 977, 983-85 (1985). Scholars and critics have created refinements
and other categories as well. See, e.g., Collins & Galie, supra note 23, at 322-39 (dividing
the states into five models of constitutional review); Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitu-
tional Relationship Between State and Federal Courts: A Critique of Michigan v. Long, 59
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1118, 1122-25 (1984) (two models: interstitial and primacy or
"classic").
45. State courts that practice the primacy method always begin their analyses of a
constitutional issue by examining the appropriate provision of the state constitution. See
State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 265, 666 P.2d 1316, 1319-20 (1983). If the state provision
does not afford a remedy, the court next examines the issue under the federal constitu-
tion. See Linde, supra note 3, at 383-84; see also Carson, "Last Things Last": A Method-
ological Approach to Legal Argument in State Courts, 19 Willamette L. Rev. 641, 647-50
(1983) (asserting that state constitution should be analyzed first). The United States
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over any federal law issues adjudicated in the case. See
supra note 13 and accompanying text. More often than not, however, state cases using
the primacy approach reach a satisfactory determination on an independent state law
basis, thereby precluding federal judicial review. See infra note 75; infra notes 59-121
and accompanying text.
A minority of states, including Maine, Montana (after 1986), New Hampshire, and
Oregon, follow the primacy theory of constitutional analysis. See, e.g., State v. Cadman,
476 A.2d 1148, 1150 (Me. 1984); State v. Johnson, 719 P.2d 1248, 1254-55 (Mont. 1986);
State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 233, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (1983); Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611,
614, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (1981); see also Carson, supra, at 647-50 (discussing the primacy
theory); Welsh, supra note 44, at 1144 (observing that state law is the primary source for
state courts to resolve civil liberties disputes).
46. Commentators label the constitutional methodology of states that rely on both
constitutions the "co-equal" or "equivalence" method. Representative states include
Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland and Utah. See, e.g., State v. Cross, 487 So. 2d 1056,
1057 (Fla. 1986) (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 248 (1987) (dead respondent);
State v. Ching, 67 Haw. 107, 109 n.1, 678 P.2d 1088, 1090 n.1 (1984); State v. Freeman,
236 Kan. 274, 281, 689 P.2d 885, 892 (1984); Webster v. State, 299 Md. 581, 592 n.3, 474
A.2d 1305, 1310 n.3 (1984); see also Pollock, supra note 44, at 983 (discussing the co-
equal approach). These states fail, or refuse, to recognize any difference between particu-
lar state and federal constitutional provisions. See, e.g., State v. Dilyerd, 467 So. 2d 301,
303 (Fla. 1985); State v. Ching, 67 Haw. 107, 109 n.1, 678 P.2d 1088, 1091 n.l (1984);
Collins & Galie, supra note 23, at 323.
The language of the state constitutional provision in question often is the same as, or
similar, to its federal counterpart. See, e.g., People v. Tisler, 103 I11. 2d 226, 235-36, 469
N.E.2d 147, 152 (1984); State v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 274, 281, 689 P.2d 885, 892 (1984).
MICHIGAN v LONG
and the interstitial method.47 As evidenced by this survey, however,
commentators may classify states according to these methodologies to
establish convenient categorizations as well as substantive findings. Ac-
tual examination of a range of cases from a particular state, reveals that
few states apply a consistent methodology. Therefore, no clear labels
generally can be applied.48 Further, state courts' members and philoso-
phies change, often resulting in a change of methodology as well. 9
State courts, however, may also interpret state provisions to mirror the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of their federal counterparts, even though the language is
not identical. See, eg., State v. Dilyerd, 467 So. 2d 301, 303 (Fla. 1985); Webster v. State,
299 Md. 581, 592 n.3, 474 A.2d 1305, 1310 n.3 (1984); People v. Smith, 420 Mich. 1, 7
n.2, 360 N.W.2d 841, 842 n.2 (1984); infra notes 181-206 and accompanying text. This
type of analysis usually leads to Supreme Court review because the ultimate basis for the
decision involves some interpretation of a federal constitutional provision. See O'Connor,
supra note 28, at 6 (this type of "state law decision.., is not independent of federal
law"); infra note 203 and accompanying text (discussing the availability of Supreme
Court review for this type of case).
47. State courts using the "interstitial" approach analyze the issue first on federal
constitutional grounds and then on state grounds. See Welsh, supra note 44, at 1133.
Many states, including Connecticut, New Jersey and New York, issue opinions consistent
with this model of review. See, e.g., State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 690-93, 529 A.2d
1245, 1246-49 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1017(1988); State v. Ramseur, 106 NJ. 123,
524 A.2d 188 (1987); People v. Stith, 69 N.Y.2d 313, 506 N.E.2d 911, 514 N.Y.S.2d 201
(1987); see also Brennan, supra note 24, at 491 (favoring the interstitial approach).
If the state constitution offers further or different protection than the United States
Constitution, the state court may base its ruling on both constitutional provisions or ex-
clusively on the applicable state provision. See, eg., People v. Smith, 34 Cal. 3d 251, 264,
667 P.2d 149, 156-57, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692, 699-700 (1983) (basing its holding on the Cali-
fornia Constitution, which offers greater protection than the United States Constitution);
People v. Millan, 69 N.Y.2d 514, 522 n.7, 508 N.E.2d 903, 907 n.7, 516 N.Y.S.2d 168,
172 n.7 (1987) (stating decision rests on both federal and state constitutional grounds); see
also Brennan, supra note 24, at 503 (state courts may extend due process guarantees
under the state constitution). The Supreme Court may review the judgments decided
solely on federal law, as well as those rulings based on intertwined state and federal law.
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983); supra note 31 and accompanying
text. When the Supreme Court reverses a case decided interstitially and remands it, the
state court is free to reinstate its original ruling based on independent state grounds. See
Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851, 862 n.2 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Delaware v.
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 24 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring); South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 396 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Such a result on remand renders the
Supreme Court's opinion advisory, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text, a result
the Court sought to prevent when it decided Michigan v. Long. See Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. at 1041.
48. For example, commentators have labeled Washington a primacy state, one that
addresses state constitutional issues before addressing any federal issue. See Abraham-
son, supra note 24, at 1170 n. 112; Collins & Galie, supra note 23, at 334. But see Pollock,
supra note 44, at 983 (categorizing Washington as following the co-equal approach). An
examination of Washington cases, however, reveals that Washington Supreme Court
opinions run the stylistic gamut, from citing Michigan Y. Long to preclude Supreme
Court review, see State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 149, 720 P.2d 436, 439 (1986), to
engaging in exclusively federal constitutional analysis, see State v. Hennings, 100 Wash.
2d 379, 382, 670 P.2d 256, 258 (1983) (en bane).
49. Such state court changes resemble the shifting viewpoints that occur on the
United States Supreme Court itself as justices leave the bench and new ones are ap-
pointed. Cf supra note 10 (change in Supreme Court attitude toward civil rights).
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This Note adopted its language-based characterization for two rea-
sons.5" First and most important, regardless of whether a particular
state's methodological jurisprudence is known-if indeed a state has
adopted one5"1-the United States Supreme Court grants review of a state
case based on the Court's examination and interpretation of the language
of the opinion, emphasized by the plain statement ruling. 2 Second, the
Court in Michigan v. Long expressed dissatisfaction with the need for
Supreme Court Justices to research extensively a state's caselaw and phi-
losophy in order to determine the adequacy and independence of a deci-
sion's state grounds.5 3
This survey divides its cases into four major categories, beginning with
those cases that most clearly indicate upon which constitution their rul-
ings are based and moving to those cases that are ambiguous and likely
to cause confusion on petition for Supreme Court review.54 Most states,
proving internally inconsistent, appear in more than one category. 5" A
few states that appear in more than one group, however, belong to cate-
gories that are similar in the effect they have on review. For example,
New Hampshire cases appear in two categories,56 both of which are
groups that clearly establish the foundation for the New Hampshire
50. Also taken into consideration is the fact that a vast body of literature already
exists on the subject of state constitutional jurisprudence and methodology. See, e.g.,
Althouse, supra note 23; Matasar & Bruch, supra note 15; Welsh, supra note 44; Com-
ment, Interpreting the State Constitution: A Survey and Assessment of Current Methodol-
ogy, 35 U. Kan. L. Rev. 593 (1987).
51. See supra notes 48-49.
52. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983); see also New York v. P.J.
Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 872 n.4 (basis of a state court decision must be clear from the
face of the opinion (citing to Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983))); Pollock,
supra note 44, at 985 ("As a practical matter, it may be unimportant whether a court
looks initially or secondarily to the state constitution as long as it knows what the state
constitution means, understands what that constitution demands, and makes a plain
statement that it is relying on the state constitution.").
53. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1039. See generally Comment, The Emerging Jurisprudence
of Justice O'Connor, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 389, 434 (1985) (discussing Justice O'Connor's
reasoning in Michigan v. Long).
54. For example, this survey separately categorizes cases that base their decisions ex-
clusively on federal constitutional grounds from those that construe a state constitutional
provision to be similar to its federal counterpart. Compare State v. Zayas, 195 Conn. 611,
490 A.2d 68 (1985) (conducting exclusively federal constitutional analysis with no men-
tion of state constitution) with Tarr v. State, 486 A.2d 672 (Del. 1984) (finding the state
and federal provisions to be similar). In the former category, the Supreme Court would
have jurisdiction to review the case, whereas in the latter, the Justices are likely to disa-
gree with respect to this issue. See Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28 (1985) (per
curiam); infra notes 181-206 and accompanying text; see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1066 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The state law ground is clearly adequate to
support the judgment, but the question whether it is independent of the Michigan
Supreme Court's understanding of federal law is more difficult."); O'Connor, supra note
28, at 6 (cases that construe provisions as similar would be open to review).
55. All states except Delaware, see infra app. II(D)(3); Indiana, see infra app.
II(D)(2); Maryland, see infra app. II(D)(3); and Missouri, see infra app. II(B), appeared
in more than one category.
56. See infra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
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court's determination.57 The internal inconsistency of the majority of
states supports this Note's ultimate conclusion that states have not fullly
integrated the Michigan v. Long directives into their systems of constitu-
tional adjudication. 8
B. Examining the Cases
1. Literal Compliance with the Plain Statement Rule59
The clearest way for a state court to follow Michigan v. Long's guide-
lines is to include in its opinion a plain statement that the court reached
its decision on independent state grounds, citing to Long for support."
Conversely, a state court may cite to Michigan v. Long when explicitly
basing its ruling on federal constitutional grounds,6 thus making a
"qualifying statement." Among the 151 cases that cited Michigan v.
Long as support for their plain statements, 22 states were represented.62
Very few states, however, consistently follow this policy,63 and several
states are represented by only 1 case in the group.64 Cases decided by
New Hampshire courts provide the best example of literal compliance.65
57. See infra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
58. See Baker, supra note 11, at 836-38. Most of the opinions that include a plain
statement of some sort come from the years 1986-1988. See infra app. 1-I. This leads to
speculation that in recent years, certain state courts have become more concerned with
delineating the basis for constitutional review. Most states, however, did not show an
increase in use of a plain statement during the five years examined. See infra app. III-VI.
59. See infra app. I for all cases examined in this category.
60. See, eg., State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 466, 724 P.2d 545, 552 (1986) (en banc)
("This holding regarding the inevitable discovery doctrine is based upon our own cases
and constitution and thereby complies with the United States Supreme Court dictates of
holdings based on independent state grounds." (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983))); State v. Jenkins, 128 N.H. 672, 674, 517 A.2d 1182, 1184 (1986) (citing to Long
in support of its plain statement). See generally Collins & Galie, supra note 17, at 32, col.
1 (discussing state court cases that have extended civil liberties under the state
constitution).
61. See eg., State v. Miskolczi, 123 N.H. 626, 628, 465 A.2d 919, 920 (1983) ("[the
defendant] did not present, argue, or brief any legal issues involving this [state] constitu-
tional provision before the trial court.... We therefore need decide only whether the
defendant's rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to our Federal Constitu-
tion were violated .... " (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983))).
62. These states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas,
Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington
and Wisconsin. See infra app. I.
63. The states that seem to follow this approach with some frequency are New Hamp-
shire, (32 of 39 New Hampshire cases examined), Arizona (7 of 12 Arizona cases ex-
amined), Washington (6 of 13 Washington examined) and Mississippi, (5 of 15
Mississippi cases examined).
64. The states with only one case in this category are California, Colorado, Kansas,
Maine, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin. See infra app.
I.
65. The New Hampshire Supreme Court follows a consistent approach more consist-
ently than any other state court. See supra note 63; see, eg., State v. Jenkins, 128 N.H.
672, 674, 517 A.2d 1182, 1184 (1986); State v. Castle, 128 N.H. 649, 651, 517 A.2d 848,
849 (1986); State v. Mercier, 128 N.H. 57, 61, 509 A.2d 1246, 1249 (1986).
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Historically, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has based its deci-
sions on independent state grounds.6 6 After Long was handed down, the
New Hampshire court quickly and easily adapted the latest mandate of
the Supreme Court and began regularly inserting plain statements in its
opinions." In State v. Ball,68 for example, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court discussed New Hampshire's jurisprudence with respect to the ju-
risdictional question of independent state grounds. Ball alleged on ap-
peal violations of both the federal and state constitutions. 69 Justice
Charles G. Douglas III stated that a defendant who raises a state consti-
tutional claim is entitled to have the state court examine the relevant
provision and make an independent determination of the protection af-
forded by the New Hampshire Constitution.70
To encourage the development of an independent body of state consti-
tutional law, two recent New Hampshire opinions provide guidance as to
the procedure state counsel should follow when raising a constitutional
claim.71 The New Hampshire Supreme Court will address state constitu-
tional claims only if a party has raised them in the lower court proceed-
66. See, e.g., State v. Settle, 122 N.H. 214, 217, 447 A.2d 1284, 1285 (1982); State v.
Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 433, 402 A.2d 493, 497 (1979); see also Douglas, State Judicial
Activism-The New Role for State Bills of Rights, 12 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1123, 1142-47
(1978) (early advocacy of the primacy theory by a New Hampshire state justice).
67. See State v. Miskolezi, 123 N.H. 626, 628, 465 A.2d 919, 920 (1983) (issuing a
qualifying statement that court based its decision on federal constitution and citing to
Long).
68. 124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983). State v. Ball involved the search and seizure
of a defendant convicted of unlawful possession of marijuana. Id. at 230, 471 A.2d at
350.
69. Id.
70. In the Ball opinion, New Hampshire Supreme Court Justice Douglas discusses
New Hampshire's jurisprudence regarding the doctrine of independent state grounds:
Even if it appears that the Federal Constitution is more protective than the
State Constitution, the right of our citizens to the full protection of the New
Hampshire Constitution requires that we consider State constitutional guaran-
tees. This is because any decision we reach based upon federal law is subject to
review by the United States Supreme Court, whereas we have unreviewable au-
thority to reach a decision based on articulated adequate and independent State
grounds. Michigan v. Long, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3475, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201
(1983). Since this court is the final authority on New Hampshire law, initial
resolution of State constitutional claims insures that the party invoking the pro-
tections of the New Hampshire Constitution will receive an expeditious and
final resolution of those claims. Therefore, we will first examine the New
Hampshire Constitution and only then, if we find no protected rights thereun-
der, will we examine the Federal Constitution to determine whether it provides
greater protection.
Id. at 232, 471 A.2d at 351 (emphasis in original).
71. See State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632-33, 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (1986) (refus-
ing to perform a state constitutional analysis of defendant's claim because defendant
failed to satisfy the required preconditions of raising the state constitutional issue in the
lower court and invoking the appropriate state provision in that party's appellate brief);
State v. Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 71, 522 A.2d 1380, 1381 (1986) (laying out when the
court will perform state constitutional analysis); infra note 207 (recommending that
courts develop such guidelines).
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ing and if that party's appellate brief specifically invokes the protection of
a state constitutional provision. 2 These guidelines help the United
States Supreme Court when deciding whether to grant certiorari, because
the Court is not so much concerned with what procedure a state court
follows for reviewing a dual constitutional claim as with the way the state
court has handled the communication of its dual constitutional analy-
sis.7 3 The insertion of a plain statement citing to Michigan v. Long to
support independent state grounds, like the one in Ball, precludes United
States Supreme Court review of constitutional issues on a petition for
certiorari.7 4 Further, the New Hampshire Supreme Court's endeavor to
establish and clarify its policy of reviewing constitutional issues indicates
that New Hampshire is building a body of state constitutional law that is
independent of its federal counterpart. 5
Those state opinions that make plain statements citing to Long illus-
trate the clearest delineation between state and federal law and pose the
fewest, if any, problems for the United States Supreme Court.7 6 The
Court will have no difficulty determining that it should decline to review
a case when the state court upheld the constitutional right and clearly
based its decision on adequate and independent state grounds,' citing
directly to Long for its express holding to that effect. 71 Conversely, the
Supreme Court will grant review of a constitutional issue when the quali-
fying statement plainly indicates that the state court based its conclusion
72. See Dellorfano, 128 N.H. at 632-33; 517 A.2d at 1166; Bradberry, 129 N.H. at 71,
522 A.2d at 1381 (1986).
73. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983) (holding basis of decision
should be clear from the face of the opinion); supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
74. This survey found no United States Supreme Court review of cases emanating
from New Hampshire between 1983-1987 that have dealt with constitutional claims de-
cided under the state constitution.
75. Cf Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039-41 (1983) (Court hoped that states
develop independent constitutional jurisprudences); supra note 33 and accompanying
text
76. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1041. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari to seven
cases found in this category. See State v. Jarzbeck, 204 Conn. 683, 707, 529 A.2d 1245,
1256 (1987), cert denied, 108 S. CL 1017 (1988); State v. Scully, 195 Conn. 668, 674 n.1 1,
490 A.2d 984, 987 n.11 (1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 293 (1987); State v. Cohane, 193
Conn. 474, 485, 479 A.2d 763, 770, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); State v. Bruzzese,
94 N.J. 210, 217 n.3, 463 A.2d 320, 324 n.3 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 (1984);
Turner v. City of Lawton, 733 P.2d 375, 381 & n.34 (Okla.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3232
(1987); State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995, 1019 (RI.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875 (1984).
Although the Court gave no explanation for its denial of certiorari, the clear communica-
tion of a plain statement may provide one reason.
77. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983); supra text accompanying note
31.
78. In addition, several New Hampshire cases make a plain statement without citing
to Michigan v. Long. Sea e.g., State v. Goding, 128 N.H. 267, 273, 513 A.2d 325, 330
(1986) (citing State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983)); City of Claremont v.
Truell, 126 N.H. 30, 35-39, 489 A.2d 581, 586-87 (1985); State v. Scarborough, 124 N.H.
363, 368, 470 A.2d 909, 913 (1983); infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text. Whatever
the chosen style, however, the New Hampshire court conscientiously and routinely deals
with this jurisidictional issue.
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on federal law. 9 A state court that clearly communicates the grounds on
which it has based its determination and cites to Michigan v. Long to
support that message has complied successfully with the aims of the plain
statement ruling. Such opinions will not lead to the rendering of advi-
sory opinions and will add to an independent body of state constitutional
law.
2. Plain Statements Without Citing to Michigan v. Long °
Many state court opinions contain a plain statement that the decision
is based solely on state law without citing to Michigan v. Long."1 State
cases also may make a qualifying statement, without citing to Long, indi-
cating clearly that their holdings are based on the federal Constitution. 82
Among the 112 cases in this category, 39 states were represented,8 3 but
only a few states follow this style of opinion-writing with frequency.84
The Colorado Supreme Court provides a good example of a court that
79. For examples of state cases the Supreme Court would review on these grounds,
see State v. Chung, 202 Conn. 39, 45 n.7, 519 A.2d 1175, 1179 n.7 (1987); Souder v.
Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 730, 735 (Ky. 1986); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389
Mass. 137, 141 n.2, 449 N.E.2d 349, 352 n.2 (1983); State v. Miskolczi, 123 N.H. 626,
628, 465 A.2d 919, 920 (1983); see also, O'Connor, supra note 28, at 6 (discussing types of
cases as either reviewable or unreviewable by the Supreme Court).
80. For cases included in this category, see infra app. II. Although categories
II(B)(1), see supra text accompanying notes 59-80, and II(B)(2), see infra text
accompanying notes 82-120, basically stand for the same principle-both issuing clear
statements to either preclude or assure review-they are distinct because those cases in
II(B)(1) contain even stronger plain statements than those in II(B)(2) due to the citations
in the former cases to Michigan v. Long, and thus offer the clearest type ofjurisdicational
statements possible.
81. See, e.g., State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 661, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1985) ("[W]c
are not bound by these [federal] decisions. '[A]s the ultimate judicial tribunal in this
state, this court has final, unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce the Hawaii
Constitution'" (quoting State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 369, 520 P.2d 51, 58 (1974)));
Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 477 So. 2d 1094, 1107 (La. 1985) ("[w]e conclude that the
federal jurisprudence should not be used as a model for the interpretation or application
of that part of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights"); Mhoon v. State, 464 So. 2d 77, 80
(Miss. 1985) ("our decision today is grounded upon the independent and adequate reme-
dies provided by the jurisprudence of this state").
82. See, e.g., State v. Hoak, 107 Idaho 742, 749 n.3, 692 P.2d 1174, 1181 n.3 (1984)
("we need not decide whether the Idaho Constitution should be interpreted to allow such
a seizure"); People v. Wiese, 425 Mich. 448, 450 n.1, 389 N.W.2d 866, 867 n.1 (1986)
("[w]e do not... consider the independent application of the Michigan Constitution due
process provision").
States that often make qualifying statements follow either the equivalency model (for
example, Montana (before 1986), Utah and Hawaii) or the interstitial model (for exam-
ple, Connecticut, Michigan and New Jersey) of constitutional analysis. See supra note 46
(discussing the equivalency theory); note 47 (discussing the interstitial approach).
83. The states in this category are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennesee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See infra app. II.
84. These states include California (8 of 23 California cases examined), Colorado (5
MICHIGAN v LONG
uses both a plain statement to preclude United States Supreme Court
review without citing Long, 5 as well as one that makes a qualifying
statement to signal a federal constitutional analysis, also without citing to
Long.
8 6
In People v. Sporleder,87 decided soon after Long, the Colorado
Supreme Court issued a plain statement that it based its decision solely
on state law. 8 The Sporleder court articulated its view on the Colorado
Constitution's search and seizure provision and of its state constitution in
general. It held that even if a state constitutional provision resembles its
federal counterpart, United States Supreme Court interpretation of the
federal provision does not bind the Colorado Supreme Court, which in-
dependently determines the scope of its state constitutional guarantees.89
On at least one occasion,"° however, the Colorado Supreme Court re-
lied on the federal Constitution in deciding an issue and clearly articu-
lated its decision not to analyze the issue independently under the state
constitution.91 In People v. Sheppard,92 the towing and destruction of a
vehicle under a hold order from the state patrol without first obtaining
authorization was found to violate the defendant's due process rights.
93
of 13 Colorado cases examined), Maine (5 of 8 Maine cases examined), New Jersey (5 of 9
New Jersey cases examined) and Oregon (5 of 9 Oregon cases examined).
85. 5 of 13 Colorado cases examined fall within this category. See e.g., People v.
Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 818 (Colo. 1985); People v. Deitchman, 695 P.2d 1146, 1148 (Colo.
1985); People v. Timmons, 690 P.2d 213, 215 (Colo. 1984); People v. Corr, 682 P.2d 20,
26 (Colo.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 136
(Colo. 1983).
86. See People v. Sheppard, 701 P.2d 49, 53-54 (Colo. 1985).
87. 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983). The lower court in Sporleder suppressed evidence
obtained by a pen register, basing its conclusion on article II, section 7 of the Colorado
Constitution, which is similar to the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.
See I at 136. The Colorado Supreme Court, acknowledging that defendant's privacy
expectation qualified for state constitutional protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures, upheld the lower court's independent interpretation of the state constitutional
provision. See id, at 140.
88. See id. at 140; accord People v. Timmons, 690 P.2d 213, 215 (Colo. 1984); People
v. Corr, 682 P.2d 20, 26 (Colo.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984).
89. See Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 140; see also People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815-16
(Colo. 1985) (holding expectation of privacy under Colorado Constitution is broader than
that of the federal Constitution); People v. Deitchman, 695 P.2d 1146, 1170-71 (Colo.
1985) (Neighbors, J., concurring) (focussing on independent state constitutional argu-
ment).
While Colorado opinions fall into more than one of this survey's categories, see supra
text accompanying note 55, they, for the most part, clearly enunciate the bases for their
decisions. For example, in addition to the 5 cases that issue plain statements without
citing to Long, one opinion cites to Michigan v. Long in support of a plain or qualifying
statement. See People v. Pope, 724 P.2d 1323, 1326 n. I (Colo. 1986). But see Kwiatkoski
v. People, 706 P.2d 407, 408 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (mentioning both federal and state
constitutional provisions in passing); People v. Walker, 666 P.2d 113, 118 (Colo. 1983)(same).
90. See People v. Sheppard, 701 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1985).
91. See id. at 53.
92. 701 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1985).
93. See id at 50-51.
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The court stated that it need not examine the issue under the Colorado
Constitution because even the federal Constitution, which offered the de-
fendant narrower protection, had been violated.94
State courts issuing a plain statement that the decision is based on state
grounds, even without citing to Michigan v. Long, successfully preclude
the United States Supreme Court from reviewing those decisions.95 To
establish adequate and independent state grounds, state courts must
make an obvious statement of state constitutional grounds before or after
its analysis of the issues. Similarly, if a state court makes a qualifying
statement that it based its ruling on federal law, its decision is open to
Supreme Court review. 96 By taking the time to analyze the state consti-
tutional claim separately, the state court fulfills one of its primary pur-
poses, to interpret state law out of fairness to the litigants. In so doing,
the court also provides state citizens with independent state constitu-
tional authority. 97
State decisions that include a plain statement when conducting state
constitutional analysis theoretically have set forth adequate and in-
dependent state grounds.9" Nonetheless, the language of such opinions
may foster confusion as to the basis for the court's ruling when the
court's state constitutional analysis relies on federal authority. 99 To alle-
viate this confusion, these decisions should state that any references to
federal law carry no greater weight than the precedent of any other juris-
diction and are not binding, thereby reaffirming that the decision is based
94. See id. at 53-54 ("We need not decide here whether the Trombetta standard of
materiality should be adopted by this court in evaluating due process challenges under
the Colorado constitution, because... even under the strict test announced in Trombetta,
the evidence destroyed in the case before us must be considered material." (citing Califor-
nia v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984))).
95. Since Michigan v. Long, the Supreme Court has refused to review at least two
state cases that were decided on adequate and independent state grounds. See People v.
Nunez, 658 P.2d 879, 881 n.2 (Colo. 1983) (basing decision on Colorado search and
seizure statutes), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 324 (1984) ("writ is dismissed ... [because] the
judgment of the court below rested on independent and adequate state grounds");
Aimone v. Finley, 113 Ill. App. 3d 507, 508, 447 N.E.2d 868, 869 (1983) (relying on
Illinois caselaw to determine plaintiff's statutory rights), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1095
(1984) (appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction); infra app. VII. But see Comment,
supra note 2, at 1309-11 (noting that Supreme Court is increasing its review of state court
cases because it seeks to reverse a trend of broadened protection of individual liberties
under state constitutions).
96. See, e.g., People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1085 n.1, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 94
n. 1, rev'd and remanded, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); People v. Bertine, 706 P.2d 411, 419 (Colo.
1985), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987); infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
97. See Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108, 677 P.2d 261, 271 (1984); State v.
Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983).
98. See, eg., People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 140 (Colo. 1983); Mhoon v. State,
464 So. 2d 77, 79-80 (Miss. 1985).
99. See, e.g., State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 711-16, 478 A.2d 227, 239-42 (1984)
(alternating between federal and state authority), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 (1985);
Head v. State, 253 Ga. 429, 430-31, 322 S.E.2d 228, 230-31 (1984) (intertwining federal
and state law); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (stating if state
and federal law are intertwined, federal jurisdiction will be presumed).
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on state grounds and precluding Supreme Court review. 100 Absent such
a statement, the Supreme Court advances to the second step of the Michi-
gan v. Long test-that is, to examine whether federal and state law are
"interwoven" so as to justify the granting of certiorari.1o'
California courts have intertwined state analysis and federal precedent
with some regularity.102 In People v. Cook,1 3 the California Supreme
Court concluded that an illegal search and seizure had occurred, thereby
violating the appellant's rights under the California Constitution."° It
based its constitutional analysis, however, on a discussion of the federal
constitutional right to privacy.10 5
In In re William G.,1 °6 another search and seizure case, the court ex-
amined both federal and state constitutional provisions, citing both con-
stitutions at the outset of the opinion,10 7 and then intertwining the
authority on which it relied.'0 8 A "clarifying" footnote stating both that
the decision was based on federal and state law and that references to
federal cases supported the "independent state grounds" of the holding
further muddled the basis of the decision." These opinions undermine
Michigan v. Long, which sought to untangle the federal and state judicial
systems." 0 The United States Supreme Court has reviewed and reversed
at least one California Supreme Court case that used this confusing type
of constitutional analysis."
Several cases that contained qualifying statements indicating that the
100. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983); see eg., State v. Kennedy, 295
Or. 260, 267, 666 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1983) ("Lest there be any doubt about it, when this
court cites federal opinions in interpreting a provision of Oregon law, it does so because it
finds the views there expressed persuasive, not because it considers itself bound to do so
by its understanding of federal doctrines.").
101. See 463 U.S. at 1040-41; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text (quoting
language in Michigan v. Long regarding intertwined state and federal grounds).
102. See eg., People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 378-85, 710 P.2d 299, 302-07, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 499, 502-07 (1985); In re William G., 40 Cal. 3d 550, 558-68, 709 P.2d 1287. 1288-
93, 221 Cal. Rptr. 118, 121-29 (1985); People v. Ruggles, 39 Cal. 3d 1, 8-13, 702 P.2d
170, 176-79, 216 Cal. Rptr. 88, 92-95 (1985). But see Note, Independent Interpretation:
California's Declaration of Rights or Declaration of Independence?, 21 Santa Clara L
Rev. 199, 201 (1981) (California preeminent in the field of independent state constitu-
tional interpretation).
103. 41 Cal. 3d 373, 710 P.2d 299, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1985).
104. See id. at 385, 710 P.2d at 307, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
105. See id. at 378-85, 710 P.2d at 302-07, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 502-07.
106. 40 Cal. 3d 550, 709 P.2d 1287, 221 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1985).
107. See id. at 556, 709 P.2d at 1288, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
108. See id. at 558-68, 709 P.2d at 1288-93, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 121-29.
109. Id at 557 n.5, 709 P.2d at 1290 n.5, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 121 n.5. The opinion reads:
We rest our decision on both state and federal law. Unless otherwise indicated,
references to the Fourth Amendment are also intended to refer to article I,
section 13, of the California Constitution. Similarly, the federal cases upon
which we rely are intended to also support certain aspects of the independent
state grounds of our decision ....
Id (emphasis added).
110. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
111. See People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597, 603, 668 P.2d 807, 809, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500,
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judges had based their rulings on federal grounds resulted in the render-
ing of an advisory Supreme Court opinion. 112 For example, in California
v. Ramos,113 the Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to review
Ramos because the California Supreme Court had based its commutation
of the defendant's death sentence exclusively on federal law and had de-
clined to undertake any state constitutional review. 14 Justice O'Connor
noted that, on remand, the California Supreme Court remained free to
examine the issues under state law. 115 The California Supreme Court
followed Justice O'Connor's suggestion and reinstated its original rul-
ing,116 based on the California Constitution and California case
authority. 117
Had the state court dealt with the state constitutional issue in its origi-
nal opinion, the additional decisions would not have been necessary.
Such ambiguity negates the effect of the plain statement and results in
unnecessary confusion on a petition to the United States Supreme Court
for certiorari.1 18 Because the Court has jurisdiction to review the federal
portion of the analysis,11 9 it properly could grant certiorari, thus creating
the possibility that, on remand, the Supreme Court opinion could be ren-
dered advisory. Further, the state high court hinders its own constitu-
tional development by intertwining state and federal caselaw and
perpetuating confusion as to which authority should be followed for in-
502 (1983) (alternately discussing both state and federal constitutions but ultimately ba-
ses its judgment on the federal Constitution), rev'd and remanded, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
112. See, e.g., People v. Trombetta I, 142 Cal. App. 3d 138, 143, 190 Cal. Rptr. 319,
322 (1983) ("Since the Hitch rule implements a federal due process standard, it is unaf-
fected by California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (d)." (citation omit-
ted)), rev'd and remanded, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), on remand, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 219
Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985); People v. Ramos I, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 600 n.24, 639 P.2d 908, 936
n.24, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 294 n.24 (1982) ("Whether or not the Briggs Instruction also
independently violates one or more provisions of the California Constitution is an issue
we need not decide. . . ."), rev'd and remanded, 463 U.S. 992 (1983), on remand, 37 Cal.
3d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1119 (1985);
Commonwealth v. Upton I, 390 Mass. 562, 573, 458 N.E.2d 717, 723-24 (1983) ("Be-
cause we conclude that the evidence seized ... should have been suppressed by applica-
tion of Fourth Amendment principles . . . we need not consider . . . art. 14 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights .... "), rev'd and remanded, 466 U.S. 727 (1984), on
remand, 394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985); see also supra notes 100-22 and accompa-
nying text (discussing possible confusion, even with a plain statement). See infra app.
VI(D) for a list of remand cases in this category.
113. 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (decided the same day as Michigan v. Long).
114. See id. at 997 n.7 (citing People v. Ramos I, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 600 n.24, 639 P.2d
908, 936 n.24, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 294 n.24 (1982) (issuing a qualifying statement)).
115. See Ramos, 463 U.S. at 997 n.7.
116. See People v. Ramos II, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1119 (1985).
117. See id. at 143, 689 P.2d at 432, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 802 ("For the reasons discussed
below, we conclude that, considered in light of longstanding California principles and
authorities, the Briggs Instruction is incompatible with state constitutional doctrine
118. Such analysis could be considered an intertwining of state and federal analysis.
See supra notes 31, 101-02 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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dependent state constitutional arguments.' 20
A state court that makes a plain statement precluding Supreme Court
review, or a qualifying statement inviting review, must be extremely me-
ticulous in drafting its opinion to ensure that such a statement is under-
standable and supported by appropriate caselaw. By so doing, the court
will avoid potential confusion of its state and federal constitutional juris-
prudence and will pose no problems of review for the Supreme Court.
3. Federal Constitutional Analysis Only 2 '
The cases in this category engage in federal constitutional analysis
without mentioning any state constitutional provision in the text of the
opinion."2 Courts undertake this type of analysis for several reasons,
including the failure of the parties to raise a state constitutional issue in
the lower court or in their appellate briefs.' 23 More often, however, a
state court engages in purely federal analysis because the state constitu-
tion plays a small role in the state's constitutional jurisprudence, at least
in the area of criminal procedure.' 24 Among 72 cases in this category, 31
states are represented.' 25 Opinions issued by the Oklahoma Court of
120. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
121. For cases included in this category, see infra app. III.
122. See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 283 Ark. 82, 671 S.W.2d 164 (1984); State v. Bar-
rett, 401 N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 1987); Billiot v. State, 454 So. 2d 445 (Miss. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985).
Juxtaposed to those cases discussed in this section are state court cases that exclusively
analyze the state constitution, with little or no mention of the federal constitution. See.
e.g., Welch v. State, 254 Ga. 603, 607, 331 S.E.2d 573, 577 (1985); In re Dostert, 324
S.E.2d 402, 409 (W.Va. 1984); see also infra app. IV (complete list of cases examined).
This, however, results from the circumstances of each case, rather than from any consis-
tent methodology. For example, a court faced with a guarantee not enumerated expressly
in the federal constitution will conduct only a state constitutional analysis. See, e g., City
& Borough of Juneau v. Quinto, 684 P.2d 127, 128 (Alaska 1984) (construing right of
privacy under Art. I, §§ 14 and 22 of the Alaska Constitution); State v. Long, 700 P.2d
153, 156 (Mont. 1985) (addressing right to privacy because Montana Constitution is one
of few state constitutions that contains such a guarantee). This situation also may occur
if the lower court based its disposition solely on the state constitution. See State v.
Thornton, 253 Ga. 524, 525, 322 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1984).
123. See State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 229, 500 A.2d 233, 239 (1985) (instructing parties
to file supplemental briefs addressing state constitutional issues if they raise the claim on
appeal).
124. See, e.g., Collins, Galie, & Kincaid, State High Courts, State Constitutions; and
Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, 13 Hastings Coast. L.Q. 599,
609 (1986) ("'The Supreme Court of Georgia does not favor the use of State Constitu-
tional law in view of the fact that in the criminal law field, especially, the state constitu-
tion gives the individual more protection than does the Federal.'" (quoting Justice
George T. Smith of the Georgia Supreme Court)); see also Abrahamson, supra note 24, at
1158 ("many, if not most, state court opinions in criminal cases refer only to the federal
constitution").
125. The states represented are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennesee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Wash-
ington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. States that provided the most cases in this category are
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Criminal Appeals provide good examples. 126
In Lowry v. State,12 7 the defendant appealed from his burglary convic-
tion.128 When it reversed the conviction, the state supreme court ex-
amined only the appropriate federal provisions, without explaining its
failure to address the state constitutional issues. 129 In another case, Post
v. State,30 the defendant appealed his rape conviction, claiming that his
right to privacy had been violated by an Oklahoma obscenity statute.131
Again, the Oklahoma court conducted only a federal constitutional anal-
ysis of the defendant's right to privacy.132 It reversed the conviction and
declared the Oklahoma obscenity statute federally unconstitutional as
applied to the facts of the case.' 33
State cases that conduct exclusively federal constitutional analysis do
not pose a problem under Michigan v. Long. The Supreme Court prop-
erly can hear such cases because they are based solely on federal law and
thus fall within the Supreme Court's discretion for review. 134 Further, in
the event that the Supreme Court reverses and remands the case, it is
unlikely that a state court would reinstate its original judgment on re-
mand because the original opinion made no mention of the state constitu-
tion. 35  Thus, little danger exists that the Court's decision will be
rendered advisory. A court, however, seems to trivialize its state consti-
tution by declining to analyze the state claims, sending a message to the
litigants and to the State's citizenry that the state constitution has little, if
any, independent value.
Arkansas (4 of 7 Arkanasas cases examined), Kansas (6 of 16 Kansas cases examined),
and Oklahoma (9 of 14 Oklahoma cases examined). See infra app. III.
126. See, e.g., Lowry v. State, 729 P.2d 511, 512 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986); Lucas v.
State, 704 P.2d 1141, 1143 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); Beeler v. State, 677 P.2d 653, 657
(Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
127. 729 P.2d 511 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
128. See id. at 512.
129. See id. at 512-13. See also Lucas v. State, 704 P.2d 1141, 1143 (Okla. Crim. App.
1985) (affirming in part and reversing in part conviction for drug possession).
130. 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 290 (1986).
131. See id. at 1107. The court recognized that the right to privacy is guaranteed to
Oklahoma citizens by statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 886 (1981). Id. at 1106-07.
132. See id. at 1107-09.
133. See id. at 1109.
134. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 538-44, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834, 847-52, 726
P.2d 516, 529-34 (1986), rev'd and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 837 (1987); People v. Connelly,
702 P.2d 722, 728-29 (Colo. 1985), rev'd and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986); State v.
Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340, 340 (Minn. 1982), rev'd and remanded, 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
State cases that conduct only state constitutional analysis and do not mention the fed-
eral constitution are not subject to Supreme Court review unless there are other federal
questions to be answered. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983); supra note
13 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., State v. Murphy II, 348 N.W.2d 764, 764 (Minn. 1984); State v. Rogers
II, 32 Ohio St. 3d 70, 71, 512 N.E.2d 581, 582 (1987). But see State v. Chrisman 11, 100
Wash. 2d 814, 815, 676 P.2d 419, 421 (1984) (Washington Supreme Court reinstates, on
state constitutional grounds, its original decision, which was based only on federal
analysis).
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4. The Gray Areas 136
State high courts frequently have failed to clarify the grounds on
which they have decided constitutional issues.' 3 7 Three types of cases
fall within this category: opinions that refer to the "constitution," but do
not specify which constitution;1 38 opinions that mention both state and
federal constitutional provisions in the same sentence or citation but
otherwise do not resolve the jurisdictional issue;' 39 and opinions that
conclude that state and federal constitutional provisions are similar or
identical.'" Because of their inherent ambiguity, opinions from these
categories most often cause problems for the Supreme Court when deter-
mining whether to review them and result in the issuance of advisory
opinions.
Each of the three types of "gray area" categories provides an example
of a style of opinion-writing that does not satisfy the plain statement
objectives of Michigan v. Long. 4 ' By failing to structure the opinions in
these categories to communicate obviously their constitutional jurisdic-
tion, these state courts invite Supreme Court review 4 2 and fail to further
the federalist goal of unique state constitutional law. 43
a. Cases that Mention "the Constitution, " but do not
Specify which Constitution '44
This survey found 11 cases, from 10 states, that discuss the "constitu-
tion" but do not specify whether they are speaking about the federal or
state constitution.' 45 That so few of these cases exist indicates that no
state consistently follows this opaque style of opinion writing.' 46
136. See infra app. V, VI for complete list of cases in this category.
137. See, e.g., Jones v. New Mexico Racing Comm'n, 100 N.M. 434, 436, 671 P.2d
1145, 1147 (1983) (discussing "due process" without clarifying to which constitution it
refers); State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St. 3d 124, 135-36, 489 N.E.2d 795, 806 (1986) (mention-
ing state and federal provisions in passing), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 240 (1986); State v.
Brennan, 526 A.2d 483, 484-85 (R.I. 1987) (finding scope of state and federal provisions
similar).
138. See, eg., State v. Galvan, 222 Neb. 104, 105, 382 N.W.2d 337, 338 (1986); Par-
kerson v. State, 100 Nev. 222, 225, 678 P.2d 1155, 1157 (1984); State v. Walstad, 119
Wis. 2d 483, 486, 351 N.W.2d 469, 473 (1984).
139. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 505 So. 2d 714, 723 (La. 1987); State v. Bynum, 680
S.W.2d 156, 160 (Mo. 1984); Wilde v. State, 706 P.2d 251, 256 (Wyo. 1985).
140. See, e.g., Argenta v. City of Newton, 382 N.W.2d 457, 460 (Iowa 1986); Little v.
State, 300 Md. 485, 493 n.3, 479 A.2d 903, 907 n.3 (1984); People v. Smith, 420 Mich. 1,
6 n.1, 360 N.W.2d 841, 842 n.1 (1984).
141. Because cases within the "gray areas" are ambiguous, they could be remanded for
clarification, but the United States Supreme Court declared this procedure undesirable in
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1983).
142. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
144. See infra app. V(A), VI(A) for a list of the cases in this subeategory.
145. The 10 states represented are Colorado, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, Ohio,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennesee, Utah and Wisconsin. See infra app. V(A),
VI(A).
146. See infra app. V(A).
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In some of these cases, the reader can assume that the court is refer-
ring to the federal Constitution. 147 For example, the opinion in People v.
Spring,148 refers only to "the constititution," without specifying which
constitution. 149 The issue, however, involved Miranda v. Arizona,' 50 sig-
nalling a probable federal basis."'5 The uncertainty caused by the Spring
court's failure to specify on which constitution it relied, however, invokes
the presumption under Michigan v. Long that the court based its decision
on federal law.' 52 This presumption subjects the state court judgment to
Supreme Court scrutiny. Thus, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 1
53
reversed the Colorado court's judgment and remanded the case.' 54 The
Long presumption also leaves open the possibility that, on remand, the
state court could reinstate its original judgment on state constitutional
grounds, a possibility recognized by Justice Marshall in his dissent in
Spring.'I" Justice Marshall emphasized the ability of the Colorado court
to interpret the state constitution so as to afford greater rights for the
defendant.' 56 If the Colorado panel followed Justice Marshall's sugges-
tion, it would render the Supreme Court's holding advisory, in effect in-
dicating that the Supreme Court had unnecessarily spent time deciding
the case.
These state court cases are the most ambiguous because they fail to
specify whether their rulings are based on state or federal constitutional
grounds.'57 This inherent ambiguity forces the Supreme Court to go be-
yond the face of the opinion' 58 to decipher whether federal or state law
supports the state court's holding. In addition, it deprives litigants of
147. See, e.g., Jones v. New Mexico State Racing Comm'n, 100 N.M. 434, 436, 671
P.2d 1145, 1147 (1983) (failing to specify whether analysis is of state or federal due pro-
cess provision, but seeming to base decision on federal authority); State v. Holmes, 338
N.W.2d 104, 105 (S.D. 1983) (mentioning the constitution without specifying which one
while quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983)); State v. Martin, 719 S.W.2d
522, 523 (Tenn. 1986) (examining "constitutionality" of state obscenity statute and using
federal precedent).
148. 713 P.2d 865 (Colo. 1985).
149. Id. at 870.
150. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
151. Spring, 713 P.2d at 870.
152. See id. at 869 n.3 (Colo. 1985); see also supra text accompanying note 29 (discuss-
ing federal jurisdictional presumption under Long).
153. See 476 U.S. 1104 (1986).
154. See Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987).
155. Id. at 862 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
156. See id. at 862 n.2. Since this survey has not found a disposition from the state
court on remand, it is too early to tell whether the Colorado court will follow Justice
Marshall's suggestion.
157. See, e.g., State v. Gilbert, 100 N.M. 392, 398, 671 P.2d 640, 646 (1983) (holding a
statute is "constitutionally sound" without further clarification), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1073 (1984); Talley v. South Carolina Higher Educ. Tuition Grants Comm., 289 S.C.
483, 483-84, 347 S.E.2d 99, 100 (1986) (discussing equal protection without distinguish-
ing between state and federal provisions).
158. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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information regarding what rights and protections are offered by the
state constitution.
b. Opinions that Mention Both Constitutional Provisions
in Passing or in Citation '3 9
Cases in this category purportedly address both the state and federal
constitutions, but the decisions merely mention the applicable constitu-
tional provisions one after the other in a sentence or in citation."t6 These
opinions fail to include a clarifying statement indicating on which consti-
tution the judges based their analyses. 6 ' This category contains 51 cases
from 26 states. 162  New York provides cases for purposes of
illustration.
63
In People v. Class,'" the New York Court of Appeals reversed the
defendant's conviction on charges of weapon possession.' 65 It cited the
state constitution in a parenthetical at the outset of the opinion 66 but
decided the issue solely on the basis of the federal Constitution. 67 On
certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals
decision and remanded the case, stating that the New York Court had
failed to satisfy the plain statement requirement of Michigan v. Long.
68
In support of its jurisdiction, the Supreme Court explained that the New
159. For cases included in this subcategory, see infra app. V(B), VI(B).
160. See, eg., Taylor v. State, 284 Ark. 103, 104, 679 S.W.2d 797, 797 (1984) ("The
quick answer is that both the federal and state constitutions guarantee that 'the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.' U.S. Const., Sixth Amendment; Ark.
Const., Art. 2 § 10 (1874)."); State v. Bynum, 680 S.W.2d 156, 160 (Mo. 1984) (en banc)
(both provisions listed consecutively); State v. Armfield, 693 P.2d 1226, 1231 (Mont.
1984) (referring to both constitutions in same citation); Jordon v. Housewright, 101 Nev.
146, 148, 696 P.2d 998, 999 (Nev. 1985) (per curiam) ("Legislative regulation of the writ
process... is neither an unconstitutional encroachment on the powers of the judiciary
nor a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in violation of the federal or state
constitutions.").
161. See, eg., State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 203, 735 P.2d 801, 813 (1987); State v.
Gaston, 198 Conn. 435, 445, 503 A.2d 594, 599 (1986); Thompson v. State, 384 N.W.2d
461, 463 (Minn. 1986). Thus, cases in this category fail to comply with Long's plain
statement requirement. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
162. The 26 states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Car-
olina, South Dakota, Tennesee, Virginia and Wyoming. See infra app. V(B), VI(B).
At least one commentator has indicated that this is a rather common way of structur-
ing an opinion. See Abrahamson, supra note 24, at 1158 (most state court opinions make
only passing reference to the state constitution).
163. 6 of 13 New York cases examined fall within this category. See. e.g., People v.
P.J. Video, Inc. I, 65 N.Y.2d 566, 569, 483 N.E.2d 1120, 1122, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988, 990
(1985); People v. Class I, 63 N.Y.2d 491, 493, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1010, 483 N.Y.S.2d 181,
182 (1984).
164. 63 N.Y.2d 491, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 483 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1984).
165. See id. at 497, 472 N.E.2d at 1013, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
166. See id at 493, 472 N.E.2d at 1010, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
167. See id. at 494, 472 N.E.2d at 1011, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
168. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1986), rev'g People v. Class 1, 63
N.Y.2d 491. 472 N.E.2d 1009, 483 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1984).
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York decision merely mentioned both constitutions and, in addition, in-
tertwined state and federal authority. 69 On remand,17 the New York
Court of Appeals rather angrily reinstated its original decision:'
71
In support of its own jurisidiction to hear the case, the Supreme Court
stated that our decision did not rest on "an independent and adequate
state ground" because it lacked the requisite "plain statement." At
this juncture, in our consideration of the case under State law, we can-
not disregard the fact that we held that article I, § 12 of our State
Constitution was violated by the search. Although on remand we have
in the past, as a matter of State law, followed Supreme Court decisions
in several cases, in none of those cases had we initially and expressly
relied on the State Constitution. Where, as here, we have already held
that the State Constitution has been violated, we should not reach a
different result following reversal on Federal constitutional grounds
unless respondent demonstrates that there are extraordinary or com-
pelling circumstances.' 72
In New York v. P.J Video, Inc.,' 73 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, dismissed the respondent's argument that the state court deci-
sion rested on independent state grounds because the New York Court of
Appeals had not issued a plain statement establishing the adequacy and
independence of state law grounds.' Because the New York Court of
Appeals decision was unclear on its face,'75 under Michigan v. Long, the
Court assumed that the state had based its decision on federal
grounds.176 Justice Rehnquist recognized that the Video court cited the
New York Constitution only once, at the beginning of the opinion, in the
same parenthetical as it cited to the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution. 77 On remand, however, the New York Court of
Appeals reinstated its original decision, this time explicitly basing its rul-
ing on the state constitution.' 78
New York judges increasingly emphasize the need for reliance on the
state constitution when deciding constitutional issues.' 79 Even when cit-
ing to Michigan v. Long in an attempt to support its "independent" state
169. See id.
170. See People v. Class II, 67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 N.E.2d 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1986)
(per curiam).
171. See id. at 433, 494 N.E.2d at 445, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
172. See id. (citations omitted).
173. 475 U.S. 868 (1986), rev'g, People v. P.J. Video, Inc. 1, 65 N.Y.2d 566, 483
N.E.2d 1120, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1985).
174. See 475 U.S. at 872 n.4.
175. See supra text accompanying note 172.
176. See New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. at 872 n.4 (1986) (citing Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)).
177. See id. (citing People v. P.J. Video, Inc. I, 65 N.Y.2d 566, 569, 483 N.E.2d 1120,
1122, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988, 990 (1985)).
178. See People v. P.J. Video, Inc. II, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 299, 501 N.E.2d 556, 558, 508
N.Y.S.2d 907, 909 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1301 (1987).
179. See Kaye, supra note 2, at 296-99.
1064 [Vol. 56
MICHIGAN v. LONG
law holding, however, the court has failed to clarify its position. 8' The
New York Court of Appeals will continue to butt heads with the
Supreme Court on this jurisdictional issue as long as it continues to ig-
nore Long's plain statement requirement. While the New York Court of
Appeals may review the case on state constitutional grounds on remand,
the Court of Appeals can help to avoid Supreme Court review by issuing
in its original decisions a plain statement that it is basing its holding on
independent state constitutional grounds. 8 ' This will also insure in-
creased reliance on the New York Constitution in future state constitu-
tional litigation by showing that the court routinely takes independent
review seriously.18
2
The fleeting references to the state constitutions in conjunction with
the federal constitutional analysis found in the cases in this category are
far from the plain statements envisioned in Michigan v. Long,"8 3 and the
states that continue to issue this type of opinion fail to comply with the
plain statement requirement.'8 These kinds of references are insufficient
to insulate state court judgments from Supreme Court review and do not
seem to foster the development of an autonomous body of state constitu-
tional law. 185
c. Cases that Find the Two Constitutional Provisions
Identical or Similar '86
This category consists of cases that construe state constitutional provi-
sions as similar or identical to their federal counterparts. 87 In these
180. See eg., People v. Millan, 69 N.Y.2d 514, 522 n.7, 508 N.E.2d 903, 907 n.7, 516
N.Y.S.2d 168, 172 n.7 (1987) (citing to Long but also stating that the decision rests
"equally" on adequate and independent state grounds while engaging in federal analysis);
People v. Stith, 69 N.Y.2d 313, 316, 506 N.E.2d 911, 912, 514 N.Y.S.2d 201, 202 (1987)
(see asterisked material) (same); In re Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board
of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 72, 510 N.E.2d 325, 333, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 464 (1987) (Simons,
J., concurring) (see asterisked material) (trying to make clear that decision is based on
adequate and independent state grounds); see also Kaye, supra note 2 (discussing the
significance of the New York Constitution).
181. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
183. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
184. See e.g., People v. Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d 61, 485 N.E.2d 221, 495 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1985),
rev'd and remanded, 107 S. CL 1714 (1987); People ex reL Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,
65 N.Y.2d 324, 480 N.E.2d 1089, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1985), rey'd and remanded, 106 S.
Ct. 3172 (1986); see also supra notes 152-77 and accompanying text (cases from this cate-
gory reviewed by the Supreme Court).
185. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1042; supra note 32-39 and accompanying text.
186. For cases included in this subcategory, see infra app. V(C), VI(C).
187. See, eg., Tarr v. State, 486 A.2d 672, 673 n.I (Del. 1984) ("[t]hese constitutional
provisions are virtually identical"); Argenta v. City of Newton, 382 N.W.2d 457, 460
(Iowa 1986) ("[W]e have interpreted the equal protection and due process provisions of
our federal and state constitutions to be substantially similar."); Little v. State, 300 Md.
485, 493 n.3, 479 A.2d 903, 907 n.3 (1984) ("We have said that [Article 26] is in pad
materia with its federal counterpart and that decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting
the Fourth Amendment are entitled to great respect."). This method of opinion writing
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cases, state courts dismiss the need for any independent state constitu-
tional analysis, analyzing the issues solely under the federal Constitu-
tion."'8 The 40 cases in this category represent 17 states, including,8 9
Maryland 9 ' and Florida, 9 ' both of which exemplify this type of
analysis. 192
In Garrison v. State,193 the defendant appealed his conviction of pos-
session with intent to sell narcotics. 94 The Maryland Supreme Court
interpreted the applicable state and federal provisions as basically identi-
cal,195 analyzed the issue under federal law, and reversed the convic-
tion.'96  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 197 and
reversed the Maryland Court's decision.' 98 Writing for the majority,
Justice Stevens carefully noted that "[r]ather than containing any 'plain
statement' that the decision rests upon adequate and independent state
grounds, the opinion indicates that the Maryland constitutional provi-
sion is construed in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment."'' 99
While the Maryland court made a judicial determination to construe
the state and federal provisions as similar, Florida amended its constitu-
tion in 1982 to require that the state search and seizure provisions be
interpreted in conformity with the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution and current Supreme Court precedent. 200 As a re-
is consistent with the co-equal method of analyzing constitutional issues. See supra note
46.
188. State constitutional analysis in these cases parallels the Supreme Court interpreta-
tion of the federal counterpart. See, e.g., Tarr v. State, 486 A.2d 672, 673 n. 1 (Del. 1984);
Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282, 289 (Fla. 1987); State v. Brennan, 526 A.2d 483, 484-85
(R.I. 1987).
189. The 17 represented states are California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Oklahoma, Rhode Island and Washington. See infra app. V(C), VI(C).
190. All of the Maryland cases examined fall within this category. See, e.g., Garrison
v. State, 303 Md. 385, 391, 494 A.2d 193, 196 (1985), rev'd and remanded, 107 S. Ct.
1013 (1987); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 493 n.3, 479 A.2d 903, 907 n.3 (1984); State v.
Gee, 298 Md. 565, 568 n.1, 471 A.2d 712, 713 n.1, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1244 (1984).
191. 6 out of the 11 Florida cases examined fall within this category. See, e.g., Dean v.
State, 478 So. 2d 38, 41 (Fla. 1985); State v. Dilyerd, 467 So. 2d 301, 303 (Fla. 1986).
192. It should be noted that in most of these cases, the court finds no constitutional
violation on either the federal or state level, especially in search and seizure cases. See,
e.g., Tarr v. State, 486 A.2d 672, 673 (Del. 1984); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 530,
673 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1983); State v. Bishop, 240 Kan. 647, 658, 732 P.2d 765, 773-74
(1987).
193. 303 Md. 385, 494 A.2d 193 (1985).
194. See id. at 387, 494 A.2d at 195.
195. See id. at 391, 494 A.2d at 196 ("Article 26 is in pari materia with the Fourth
Amendment.").
196. See id. at 392-95, 494 A.2d 196-98.
197. Maryland v. Garrison, 475 U.S. 1009 (1986).
198. Maryland v. Garrison, 107 S. Ct. 1013, 1019 (1987).
199. Id. at 1016-17 (citation omitted).
200. See Fla. Const. art. I, § 12 (1982). For a discussion of Florida's unique amend-
ment, see generally Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of
Florida's "Forced Linkage" Amendment, 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 653 (1987); Note, State Con-
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suit, all Florida opinions involving search and seizure issues, before they
begin to discuss any constitutional question, include a statement that
state and federal provisions must conform. 20'
States that have amended their state constitutions to require conform-
ity2 2 may be distinguished from those that construe federal and state
constitutional provisions based on judicially-created practice.20 3 States,
such as Maryland, that consistently have construed state and federal con-
stitutional provisions to be similar remain free in future decisions to rein-
terpret the state provisions independently.2" In Florida, however, the
state constitution, absent further amendment, binds the court to follow
the federal lead.20 5
Opinions that link the state constitution to the federal Constitution are
confusing in that they do not distinguish their analytical foundations.20 6
They technically are ambiguous because the judgments are based on both
state and federal constitutions.20 7 As a result, the United States Supreme
Court can adjudicate the federal portion of the decision that is often inex-
tricably intertwined with the state portion of the analysis.20 8 Further,
stitutions Realigning Federalism: A Special Look at Florida, 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 733
(1987).
201. See, e.g., State v. Hume, 512 So. 2d 185, 187 (Fla. 1987); Dean v. State, 478 So. 2d
38, 41 (Fla. 1985); State v. Dilyerd, 467 So. 2d 301, 303 (Fla. 1985).
202. In addition to Florida, California has amended its constitution to contain a provi-
sion that requires conformity to United States Supreme Court decisions concerning the
exclusionary rule. See Cal. Const. art. I, § 28(d) (1982) (making all relevant evidence
admissible in criminal proceedings).
203. In addition to Maryland, these states are Kansas and Delaware. See. eg., Tarr v.
State, 486 A.2d 672, 673 n.1 (Del. 1984); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 531, 673 P.2d
1174, 1177 (1983).
204. This survey did not find such an example. See infra app. VI(C). Presumably,
once the state court has determined the state constitutional provision to be the same as its
federal counterpart, there could be nothing new to consider under the state constitution.
For example, in Commonwealth v. Goldhammer II, 512 Pa. 587, 517 A.2d 1280 (1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1613 (1987), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly declined
to extend double jeopardy protection further under the state constitution than provided
for by the federal Constitution. See id at 592, 517 A.2d at 1283.
205. See supra text accompanying note 197.
206. See, e.g., People v. Whitt, 36 Cal. 3d 724, 737 n.8, 685 P.2d 1161, 1168 n.8, 205
Cal. Rptr. 810, 817 n.8 (1984); State v. James, 393 N.W.2d 465, 466 (Iowa 1986); Dixon
v. State, 737 P.2d 942, 944-45 (Okla. 1987).
207. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
208. See Abrahamson & Gutmann, The New Federalism: State Constitutions and State
Courts, 77 Judicature 88, 97 (1987) ("The Court will presume that state court decisions
resolving federal and state issues rest on the resolution of the federal issues in the case.");
Althouse, supra note 23, at 1503 (presumption in favor of federal review); Collins &
Galie, supra note 23, at 323-24; Comment, supra note 50, at 611-15; Note, supra note 10,
at 616 (discussing the mechanics of this presumption).
For purposes of Supreme Court review, holding the state and federal provisions to be
similar or identical resembles issuing a qualifying statement, because the state court re-jects any independent state constitutional interpretation and engages in federal constitu-
tional analysis. Compare Garrison v. State, 303 Md. 385, 391, 494 A.2d 193, 196 (1985)
(holding state provision in pari materia with federal counterpart), rev'd and remanded,
107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987) with People v. Ramos I, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 600 n.24, 639 P.2d 908,
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these cases create an interpretation of the state constitution that parallels
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution.
CONCLUSION
In Michigan v. Long, the Supreme Court indicated that it would deter-
mine its ability to review state court decisions upholding constitutional
rights based on the language of the decisions themselves, and that it
would favor federal review if the state decision was ambiguous on this
point. It believed that this approach would promote the development of
the states' constitutional philosophies, unimpeded by federal interpreta-
tion. Significantly, the Court suggested a systematic and concise way for
state courts to delineate the constitutional foundation of their decisions
to the Supreme Court.
An examination of the various methods of opinion-writing used by
state courts after Michigan v. Long and their potential consequences for
United States Supreme Court review and independent constitutional de-
velopment leads to the conclusion that few states have adopted a consis-
tent, concise way of communicating the bases for their constitutional
decisions. Although a few exceptions exist, state courts have failed to
establish universal procedural guidelines for structuring constitutional
decisions over the past five years.
If state courts seek to develop state constitutional jurisprudence, they
should do so using federal constitutional interpretation only for gui-
dance, not for results.2 °9 State courts can begin this process by plainly
stating the bases for their constitutional decisions and by encouraging
litigants and the attorneys appearing before them to raise state constitu-
tional issues at all phases of the proceedings. Until state courts clearly
and systematically address this issue, the dual fora provided by state and
federal courts for the development of constitutional thought will remain
confused and inefficient. The United States Supreme Court will continue
to review decisions in which the jurisdiction is ambiguous or unclear and
will continue to render advisory opinions, and state constitutional law,
936 n.24, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 294 n.24 (1982) (finding no need to reach independent
analysis under state constitution), rev'd and remanded, 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
209. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). State courts also can foster
development of an independent body of state constitutional jurisprudence by establishing
guidelines for attorneys within their jurisidiction to raise distinct state constitutional ar-
guments in their briefs and at trial. See, e.g., State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632, 517
A.2d 1163, 1166 (1986); Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 613-19, 625 P.2d 123, 126-29
(1981); State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 229-30, 500 A.2d 233, 238-39 (1985). For possible
guidelines, see Bamberger, Boosting Your Case With Your State Constitution, A.B.A. J.
Mar. 1, 1986, at 49; Carson, supra note 95, at 650-52; Utter & Pitler, Presenting a State
Constitutional Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 Ind. L. Rev. 635
(1987); Note, supra note 10, at 625-28.
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entitled to a unique development and existence, will remain in the
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Pierre Chouteau Condominiums v. State Tax Comm'n, 662 S.W.2d 513
(Mo. 1984)
Western Energy Co. v. Genie Land Co., 737 P.2d 478 (Mont. 1987)
State v. Johnson, 719 P.2d 1248 (Mont. 1986)
Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495 (Mont. 1985)
State v. Perry, 223 Neb. 556, 391 N.W.2d 566 (1986)
State v. Havlat, 218 Neb. 602, 357 N.W.2d 464 (1984)
Holyfield v. State, 101 Nev. 793, 711 P.2d 834 (1985)
State v. Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 522 A.2d 1380 (1986)
State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 517 A.2d 1163 (1986)
State v. Goding, 128 N.H. 267, 513 A.2d 325 (1986)
State v. Riley, 126 N.H. 257, 490 A.2d 1362 (1985)
City of Claremont v. Truell, 126 N.H. 30, 489 A.2d 581 (1985)
State v. Scarborough, 124 N.H. 363, 470 A.2d 909 (1983)
State v. Hamel, 123 N.H. 670, 466 A.2d 555 (1983)
State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987)
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State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 524 A.2d 130 (1987)
State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189, 519 A.2d 1361 (1986)
State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986)
State v. Hall, 93 N.J. 552, 461 A.2d 1155, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008
(1983)
Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 216
N.J. Super. 461, 524 A.2d 430 (1987)
People v. Gokey, 60 N.Y.2d 309, 457 N.E.2d 723, 469 N.Y.S.2d 618
(1983)
State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 319 S.E.2d 254 (1984)
City of Bismark v. Altevogt, 353 N.W.2d 760 (N.D. 1984)
State ex rel. the Repository v. Unger, 28 Ohio St. 3d 418, 504 N.E.2d 37
(1986)
State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St. 3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264 (1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1032 (1985)
Rawlings v. State, 740 P.2d 153 (Okl. Crim. App. 1987)
Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 (1987)
State v. Brown, 301 Or. 268, 721 -P.2d 1357 (1986)
State v. Moyle, 299 Or. 691, 705 P.2d 740 (1985)
State v. Campbell, 299 Or. 633, 705 P.2d 694 (1985)
Salem College & Academy, Inc. v. Employment Div., 298 Or. 471, 695
P.2d 25 (1985)
Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981)
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987)
Commonwealth v. Simon, 509 Pa. 548, 506 A.2d 392 (1986)
Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 470 A.2d 457 (1983)
State v. Moretti, 521 A.2d 1003 (R.I. 1987)
State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367 (R.I. 1984)
State v. Jones, 406 N.W.2d 366 (S.D. 1987)
State v. Auen, 342 N.W.2d 236 (S.D. 1984)
State ex rel. Lockert V. Crowell, 729 S.W.2d 88 (Tenn. 1987)
State v. Prier, 725 S.W.2d 667 (Tenn. 1987)
State v. Jennette, 706 S.W.2d 614 (Tenn. 1986)
State v. Wilkins, 655 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn. 1983)
Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1985)
State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986)
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986)
State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985)
American Fork City v. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985)
State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562,496 A.2d 442 (1985)
State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 450 A.2d 336 (1982)
State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984)
State v. Gore, 101 Wash. 2d 481, 681 P.2d 227 (1984)
State v. Bonham, 317 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1984)
State v. Cooper, 304 S.E.2d 851 (W. Va. 1983)
State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985)
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Brown v. State, 738 P.2d 1092 (Wyo. 1987)
III. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS ONLY
Ex parte Love, 513 So. 2d 24 (Ala. 1987)
Ex parte Cochran, 500 So. 2d 1179 (Ala. 1985), cert denied, 107 S. Ct.
1965 (1987)
Ex parte Hilley, 484 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1985)
Robison v. Francis, 713 P.2d 259 (Alaska 1986)
Duncan v. State, 291 Ark. 521, 726 S.W.2d 653 (1987)
Fairchild v. State, 284 Ark. 289, 681 S.W.2d 380 (1984), cert denied, 471
U.S. 1111 (1985)
Linell v. State, 283 Ark. 162, 671 S.W.2d 741, cert denied, 470 U.S. 1062
(1984)
Richardson v. State, 283 Ark. 82, 671 S.W.2d 164 (1984)
State v. Smith, 200 Conn. 465, 512 A.2d 189 (1986)
State v. Aversa, 197 Conn. 685, 501 A.2d 370 (1985)
State v. Castro, 196 Conn. 421, 493 A.2d 223 (1985)
State v. Alfonso, 195 Conn. 624, 490 A.2d 75 (1985)
State v. Zayas, 195 Conn. 611, 490 A.2d 68 (1985)
State v. Young, 191 Conn. 636, 469 A.2d 1189 (1983)
Bassett v. State, 449 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984)
Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 885, 311 S.E.2d 427, cerL denied, 467 U.S.
1241 (1984)
State v. Langley, 110 Idaho 895, 719 P.2d 1155, cert denied, 107 S. Ct.
210 (1986)
State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 726 P.2d 735 (1986)
People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 473 N.E.2d 1227 (1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1120 (1985)
State v. Barrett, 401 N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 1987)
State v. Baker, 239 Kan. 403, 720 P.2d 1112 (1986)
State v. Epperson, 237 Kan. 707, 703 P.2d 761 (1985)
State v. Parker, 236 Kan. 353, 690 P.2d 1353 (1984)
State v. Bristor, 236 Kan. 313, 691 P.2d 1 (1984)
Unified School Dist. No. 503 v. McKinney, 236 Kan. 224, 689 P.2d 860
(1984)
Standish v. Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div., 235 Kan. 900,
683 P.2d 1276 (1984)
State v. Seward, 509 So. 2d 413 (La. 1987)
State v. Harper, 430 So. 2d 627 (La. 1983)
State v. Knowlton, 489 A.2d 529 (Me. 1985)
State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143 (Me. 1985)
Commonwealth v. Allen, 395 Mass. 448, 480 N.E.2d 630 (1985)
Commonwealth v. Pietrass, 392 Mass. 892, 467 N.E.2d 1368 (1984)
State v. Golbey, 366 N.W.2d 600 (Minn.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 922
(1985)
Billiot v. State, 454 So. 2d 445 (Miss.), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1984)
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Booker v. State, 449 So. 2d 209 (Miss.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984)
Wilcher v. State, 448 So. 2d 927 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034
(1985)
State v. Vrtiska, 225 Neb. 454, 406 N.W.2d 114, cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
180 (1987)
State v. Dittrich, 223 Neb. 461, 390 N.W.2d 527 (1987)
State v. Burchett, 218 Neb. 78, 352 N.W.2d 188 (1984)
Odoms v. State, 714 P.2d 568 (Nev. 1986)
State v. Chapman, 104 N.M. 324, 721 P.2d 392 (1986)
People v. Mercado, 68 N.Y.2d 874, 501 N.E.2d 27, 508 N.Y.S.2d 419
(1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1313 (1987)
People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984)
State v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 340 S.E.2d 80 (1986)
State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985)
State v. Gonzalez, 311 N.C. 80, 316 S.E.2d 229 (1984)
State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E.2d 304 (1983)
State v. Gronlund, 356 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 1984)
State v. Ennis, 334 N.W.2d 827 (N.D.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983)
Rawlings v. State, 740 P.2d 153 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987)
Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 290 (1987)
Lowry v. State, 729 P.2d 511 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986)
Lucas v. State, 704 P.2d 1141 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985)
Liles v. State, 702 P.2d 1025 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1164 (1986)
Cooks v. State, 699 P.2d 653 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
935 (1985)
Beeler v. State, 677 P.2d 653 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984)
Cooper v. State, 671 P.2d 1168 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983)
Gary Concrete Prods. v. Riley, 285 S.C. 498, 331 S.E.2d 335 (1985)
State v. Perry, 278 S.C. 490, 299 S.E.2d 324, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 908
(1983)
State v. Bonrud, 393 N.W.2d 785 (S.D. 1986)
State v. Devine, 372 N.W.2d 132 (S.D. 1985)
Bemis Pentacostal Church v. State, 731 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1987), appeal
dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1102 (1988)
Koonce v. State, 651 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)
State v. Taylor, 145 Vt. 437, 491 A.2d 1034 (1985)
State v. Neale, 145 Vt. 423, 491 A.2d 1025 (1985)
Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 331 S.E.2d 422 (1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1099 (1986)
State v. Hennings, 100 Wash. 2d 379, 670 P.2d 256 (1983)
State v. Woodall, 100 Wash. 2d 74, 666 P.2d 364 (1983)
State v. Brady, 130 Wis. 2d 443, 388 N.W.2d 151 (1986)
State v. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670, 360 N.W.2d 43 (1985)
Fondren v. State, 724 P.2d 461 (Wyo. 1986)
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Patterson v. State, 691 P.2d 253 (XVyo. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020
(1985)
IV. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS ONLY
City of Juneau v. Quinto, 684 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1984)
Hall v. A.N.R. Freight System, Inc, 149 Ariz. 130, 717 P.2d 434 (1986)
People v. Turner, 37 Cal. 3d 302, 690 P.2d 669, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1984)
Welch v. State, 254 Ga. 603, 331 S.E.2d 573 (1985)
State v. Thornton, 253 Ga. 524, 322 S.E.2d 711 (1984)
State v. Woolridge, 237 Kan. 737, 703 P.2d 1375 (1985)
People v. Turmon, 417 Mich. 638, 340 N.W.2d 620 (1983)
State v. Long, 700 P.2d 153 (Mont. 1985)
State v. Ball, 104 N.M. 176, 718 P.2d 686 (1986)
State v. Graves, 299 Or. 189, 700 P.2d 244 (1985)
In re Dostert, 324 S.E.2d 402 (V. Va. 1984)
State v. Buck, 314 S.E.2d 406 (NV. Va. 1984)
V. GRAY AREAS
A. Cases that Mention the "Constitution" but not which Constitution
Jones v. New Mexico Racing Commn, 100 N.M. 434, 671 P.2d 1145
(1983)
State v. Gilbert, 100 N.M. 392, 671 P.2d 640 (1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1073 (1984)
State v. Galvan, 222 Neb. 104, 382 N.W.2d 337 (1986)
Parkerson v. State, 100 Nev. 222, 678 P.2d 1155 (1984)
State v. Zuern, 32 Ohio St. 3d 56, 512 N.E.2d 585 (1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 786 (1988)
Talley v. South Carolina Higher Educ. Tuition Grants Comm., 289 S.C.
483, 347 S.E.2d 99 (1986)
State v. Holmes, 338 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1983)
State v. Martin, 719 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1986)
State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986)
State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984)
B. Opinions that Mention Both Constitutions in Passing or in Citation
Ex parte Maddox, 502 So. 2d 786 (Ala. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
2185 (1987)
State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801 (1987)
State v. Martin, 139 Ariz. 466, 679 P.2d 489 (1984)
State v. Yslas, 139 Ariz. 60, 676 P.2d 1118 (1984)
Taylor v. State, 284 Ark. 103, 679 S.W.2d 797 (1984)
Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Vick, 284 Ark. 372, 682 S.W.2d 731
(1985)
J. W Black Lumber Co. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control & Ecology,
290 Ark. 170, 717 S.W.2d 807 (1986)
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Kwiatoski v. People, 706 P.2d 407 (Colo. 1985)
People v. Walker, 666 P.2d 113 (Colo. 1983)
State v. Gaston, 198 Conn. 435, 503 A.2d 594 (1986)
State v. Perry, 195 Conn. 505, 488 A.2d 1256 (1985)
State v. Johnson, 190 Conn. 541, 461 A.2d 981 (1983)
Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1011
(1988)
People v. Stout, 106 Ill. 2d 77, 477 N.E.2d 498 (1985)
People v. Gaines, 105 Ill. 2d 79, 473 N.E.2d 868 (1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1131 (1985)
People v. Hoskins, 101 Ill. 2d 209, 461 N.E.2d 941, cert. denied, 469 U.S.
840 (1984)
People v. Gurell, 98 Ill. 2d 194, 456 N.E.2d 18 (1983)
Hicks v. State, 510 N.E.2d 676 (Ind. 1987)
Gee v. State, 508 N.E.2d 787 (Ind. 1987)
B & M Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 501 N.E.2d 401 (Ind. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2183 (1987)
Merriweather v. State, 499 N.E.2d 209 (Ind. 1986)
Brown v. State, 495 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 1986)
State v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 274, 689 P.2d 885 (1984)
Smith v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 762 (1988)
Ford v. Commonwealth, 665 S.W.2d 304 (Ky. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 984 (1984)
State v. Brooks, 505 So. 2d 714 (La.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 337 (1987)
State v. Berry, 430 So. 2d 1005 (La. 1983)
People v. Hayes, 421 Mich. 271, 364 N.W.2d 635 (1984)
Thompson v. State, 384 N.W.2d 461 (Minn. 1986)
State v. Bynum, 680 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. 1984)
State v. Armfield, 693 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984)
State v. Purdie, 209 Mont. 352, 680 P.2d 576 (1984)
State v. Bocian, 226 Neb. 613, 413 N.W.2d 893 (1987)
Jordon v. Housewright, 101 Nev. 146, 696 P.2d 998 (1985)
People v. Kozlowski, 69 N.Y.2d 761, 505 N.E.2d 611, 513 N.Y.S.2d 101
(1987)
People v. Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159, 505 N.E.2d 586, 513 N.Y.S.2d 75
(1987)
State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St. 3d 124, 489 N.E.2d 795, cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 240 (1986)
Gridier v. State, 743 P.2d 678 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987)
Miles v. State, 742 P.2d 1150 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987)
Stohler v. State, 696 P.2d 1038 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985)
State v. Ricci, 472 A.2d 291 (R.I. 1984)
State v. Lawson, 279 S.C. 266, 305 S.E.2d 249 (1983)
Stacey v. State, 349 N.W.2d 439 (S.D. 1984)
State v. Seagroves, 691 S.W.2d 537 (Tenn. 1985)
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State v. Mitchell, 682 S.W.2d 918 (Tenn. 1984)
Haddad v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 325, 329 S.E.2d 17 (1985)
Charpentier v. State, 736 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1987)
Pellatz v. State, 711 P.2d 1138 (Vyo. 1986)
Roberts v. State, 711 P.2d 1131 (Wyo. 1985)
Wilde v. State, 706 P.2d 251 (Wyo. 1985)
Hunter v. State, 704 P.2d 713 (Wyo. 1985)
C. Cases that Find Two Constitutional Provisions
to be Similar or Identical
People v. Whitt, 36 Cal. 3d 724, 685 P.2d 1161, 205 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1984)
In re Carolyn S.S. and Michael J.S., 498 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1984)
Tarr v. State, 486 A.2d 672 (Del. 1984)
State v. Hume, 512 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1987)
State v. Cross, 487 So. 2d 1056 (Fla.), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 248
(1986)
State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986)
Dean v. State, 478 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1985)
State v. Dilyerd, 467 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1985)
Washington v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 708 P.2d 129 (Haw. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986)
State v. Ching, 67 Haw. 107, 678 P.2d 1088 (1984)
State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1, 704 P.2d 333 (1985)
State v. Lewis, 107 Idaho 616, 691 P.2d 1231 (1984)
State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 672 P.2d 561 (1983)
People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 469 N.E.2d 147 (1984)
State v. James, 393 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1986), appeal dismissed, 107 S. Ct.
1881 (1987)
Argenta v. City of Newton, 382 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1986)
Stracke v. City of Council Bluffs, 341 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1983)
State v. Seager, 341 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1983)
State v. Bishop, 240 Kan. 647, 732 P.2d 765 (1987)
State v. Strauch, 239 Kan. 203, 718 P.2d 613 (1986)
State v. Lambert, 238 Kan. 444, 710 P.2d 693 (1985)
State ex reL Pringle v. Heritage Baptist Temple, Inc., 236 Kan. 544, 693
P.2d 1163 (1985)
State v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 274, 689 P.2d 885 (1984)
State v. Fortune, 236 Kan. 248, 689 P.2d 1196 (1984)
Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984)
Webster v. State, 299 Md. 581, 474 A.2d 1305 (1984)
State v. Gee, 298 Md. 565, 471 A.2d 712, cert denied, 467 U.S. 1244
(1984)
People v. Smith, 420 Mich. 1, 360 N.W.2d 841 (1984)
State v. Lohnes, 344 N.W.2d 605 (Minn. 1984)
Neal v. State, 451 So. 2d 743 ('Miss.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1098 (1984)
Dixon v. State, 737 P.2d 942 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987)
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Champeau v. State, 678 P.2d 1192 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 880 (1984)
State v. Brennan, 526 A.2d 483 (R.I. 1987)
State v. Timms, 505 A.2d 1132 (R.I. 1986)
VI. CASES REVIEWED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
REMAND CASES; REVERSED AND NOT REMANDED;
REVERSED AND AFFIRMED
A. Cases that Mention the "Constitution" but do not
Specify which Constitution
People v. Spring, 713 P.2d 865 (Colo. 1985), rev'd and remanded, 107 S.
Ct. 851 (1987)
B. Opinions that Mention Both Constitutional Provisions in Passing
or in Citation
Van Arsdall v. State, 486 A.2d 1 (Del. 1984), vacated and remanded, 475
U.S. 673 (1986), on remand, 524 A.2d 3 (Del. 1987)
People v. Krull, 107 Ill. 2d 107, 481 N.E.2d 703 (1985), rev'd and re-
manded, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987)
Stincer v. Commonwealth, 712 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct.
2658 (1987) (not remanded)
People v. Bladel, 421 Mich. 39, 365 N.W.2d 56 (1984), aff'd, 475 U.S.
625 (1986)
People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 320 N.W.2d 866 (1982), rev'd and re-
manded, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), on remand, 419 Mich. 636, 359
N.W.2d 194 (1984)
State v. Jackson, 195 Mont. 185, 637 P.2d 1 (1981), vacated for clarifica-
tion, 460 U.S. 1030, on remand, 206 Mont. 338, 672 P.2d 255 (1983)
People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 65 N. Y.2d 566, 483 N.E.2d 1120, 493 N. YS.2d
988 (1985), rev'd and remanded, 475 U.S. 868, on remand, 68 N.Y.2d
296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1301 (1987)
People v. Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d 61, 485 N.E.2d 221, 495 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1985),
rev'd and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987), on remand, 70 N.Y.2d
733, 514 N.E.2d 379, 519 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1987)
People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 324, 480 N.E.2d
1089, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1985), rev'd and remanded, 478 U.S. 697, on
remand, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986)
People v. Class, 63 N.Y.2d 491, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 483 N.Y.S.2d 181
(1984), rev'd and remanded, 475 U.S. 106, on remand, 67 N.Y.2d 431,
494 N.E.2d 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1986) (per curiam)
State v. Rogers, 17 Ohio St. 3d 174, 478 N.E.2d 984, vacated and re-




State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 459
U.S. 553 (1983), on remand, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D. 1984)
C. Cases that Find Two Constitutional Provisions
to be Similar or Identical
People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597, 668 P.2d 807, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500
(1983), rev'd and remanded, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)
Garrison v. State, 303 Md. 385, 494 A.2d 193 (1985), rev'd and re-
manded, 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987)
State v. Johnson, 6 Ohio St. 3d 420, 453 N.E.2d 595 (1983), rev'd and
remanded, 467 U.S. 493 (1984)
Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 507 Pa. 236, 489 A.2d 1307, rev'd and
remanded, 474 U.S. 28 (1985), on remand, 512 Pa. 587, 517 A.2d 1280
(1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1613 (1987)
Commonwealth v. Finley, 330 Pa. Super. 313, 479 A.2d 568 (1984), rev'd
and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 1990 (1987)
State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 321 N.W.2d 245 (1982), vacated and
remanded, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)
D. Qualifying Statements
People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266
(1982), rev'd and remanded, 463 U.S. 992 (1983), on remand, 37 Cal.
3d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1119 (1985)
People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1984), rev'd
and remanded, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)
People v. Trombetta, 142 Cal. App. 3d 138, 190 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1983),
rev'd and remanded, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), on remand, 173 Cal. App.
3d 1093, 219 Cal Rptr. 637 (1985)
People v. Bertine, 706 P.2d 411 (Colo. 1985), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987)
(not remanded)
State v. Barrett, 197 Conn. 50, 495 A.2d 1044 (1985), rev'd and re-
manded, 107 S. Ct. 828 (1987), on remand, 205 Conn. 437, 534 A.2d
219 (1988)
Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d 959 (Del.), rev'd and remanded, 474 U.S. 15
(1985), on remand, 509 A.2d 1106 (Del. 1986)
Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 458 N.E.2d 717 (1983), rev'd
and remanded, 466 U.S. 727 (1984), on remand, 394 Mass. 363, 476
N.E.2d 548 (1985)
Real v. Walpole, 390 Mass. 399, 456 N.E.2d 1111 (1983), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, on remand, Real v.
Walpole, 396 Mass. 1001, 482 N.E.2d 1188 (1985)
Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), rev'd
and remanded, 468 U.S. 981 (1984), on remand, 394 Mass. 381, 476
N.E.2d 541 (1985)
Witters v. Washington State Comm'n for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624,
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689 P.2d 53 (1984), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Witters v. Washing-
ton Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
E. Federal Constitutional Analysis Only
People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 726 P.2d 516, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1985),
rev'd and remanded, 479 U.S. 157 (1987)
People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1985), rev'd and remanded, 479
U.S. 157 (1986)
Myers v. State, 432 So. 2d 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd and re-
manded, 466 U.S. 380, on remand, 457 So. 2d 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (per curiam)
James v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1983), rev'd and re-
manded, 466 U.S. 341, on remand 679 S.W.2d 238 (Ky. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1086 (1985)
State v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982), rev'd and remanded, 466
U.S. 170, on remand, 485 A.2d 952 (Me. 1984)
State v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340 (Minn. 1982), rev'd and remanded, 465
U.S. 420, on remand, 348 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1984)
Caldwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 806 (Miss. 1983), rev'd and remanded, 472
U.S. 320, on remand, 481 So. 2d 850 (Miss. 1985), aff'd, 492 So. 2d
575 (Miss. 1986), vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 1269 (1987)
People v. Burger, 67 N.Y.2d 338, 493 N.E.2d 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702
(1986), rev'd and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987)
People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E.2d 984, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520
(1982), rev'd and remanded, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), on remand, 63
N.Y.2d 923, 473 N.E.2d 30, 483 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1984) (mem.)
Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), rev'd and re-
manded, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), on remand, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1983)
State v. Chrisman, 94 Wash. 2d 711, 619 P.2d 971 (1980), rev'd and re-
manded, 455 U.S. 1 (1982), on remand, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d
419 (1984)
VIi. CERTIORARI DENIED OR DISMISSED DUE TO ADEQUATE AND
INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS
People v. Nunez, 658 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1983), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 324
(1984)
Casal v. State, 411 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), cert. dismissed,
462 U.S. 637 (1983) (per curiam)
Aimone v. Finley, 113 Ill. App. 3d 507, 447 N.E.2d 868 (1983), appeal
dismissed, 465 U.S. 1095 (1984)
Commonwealth v. Blair, 592 S.W.2d 132 (Ky. 1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 962 (1980)
Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. Frappier, 681 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. 1984), va-
cated and remanded, 472 U.S. 1014, on remand, 698 S.W.2d 326 (Mo.
1985)
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People v. Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514
(1983), cert. dismissed, 467 U.S. 246 (1984) (per curiam)
State ex reL Jones v. Warmuth, 165 W. Va. 825, 272 S.E.2d 446,
appeal dismissed, 451 U.S. 977 (1981)

